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This thesis explores and analyses China’s internal and external information control 
capabilities, as well as China’s quest to influence Internet governance.  China’s external 
espionage, IP theft, and network manipulation is researched in parallel to its ‘peaceful 
rise’ rhetoric.  The paper finds that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses these 
capabilities to stimulate continued economic growth, and that these actions are based in 
resentment for past Western behavior.  The image of ‘peaceful rise’ does not completely 
contradict China’s information theft and sabotage.  Analysis shows this paradox of action 
and word is a reflection of disagreement at the highest levels of the CCP.  The second 
chapter studies China’s internal information control.  Within China’s national borders, the 
CCP carries out pervasive propaganda, censorship, and control efforts, including who has 
online access; what they can access, and what their personal communications content is.  
One goal of this information control and propaganda is to nurture a passionate 
nationalism to increase political and social stability.  These methods to influence and their 
results are explored to determine if these efforts are successful.  Chinese nationalism 
does add legitimacy to the CCP regime, but does not increase social stability.  
Furthermore, the study discovered a bottom-up nationalism that is committed to 
improving their motherland, yet does not attract strong CCP support.  The third chapter 
looks at China’s current push to influence Internet governance.  In light of the Snowdon 
revelations, distrust of US oversight of ICANN has increased, especially due to its present 
US Department of Commerce oversight.  This paper looks at scholarly discussions about 
Internet governance, specifically the multi-stakeholder model, including the present 
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culture of the current Internet governance (IG).  It compares Internet governance models, 
including the top-down strong government control model China advocates.  This paper 
finds the Internet must be governed by a technically specialized array of people, business, 
and organizations to continue innovation and speedy communications.  Too much 
government influence will hamper the Internet’s capabilities.  IG must focus on retaining 
a multi-organization, multi-stakeholder model, while seeking to educate developing 
nations on the economic advantages of an open Internet, and welcoming government 
influence in specific areas, such as capacity building and information sharing in key areas. 
Thesis advisor: Professor Dorothea Wolfson 
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This thesis is a study of China’s efforts to control information within its national 
boundaries, on foreign territory, and its aspirations to influence Internet governance to 
legitimize and further its aims.  China has the largest information control apparatus in 
the world.1  China’s Internet firewall is a well-known instrument of information 
censorship.  Likewise, China’s monumental cyber-espionage campaigns to steal billions 
of dollars of intellectual property (IP) from foreign targets are also well documented.  
Less understood are China’s pervasive domestic and foreign propaganda promotions; 
efforts to sabotage and manipulate information; and well-funded programs to steer 
online conversations and mold an “ideologically correct” citizen.  Furthermore, China is 
now using its economic and political influence to impact current Internet governance, 
which presently advocates a frictionless flow of information.  China’s overall information 
strategy, outlined by these actions, is diametrically opposed to the Western values of 
freedom of expression, information freedom, and rights to privacy.  This represents a 
struggle over basic information ideology, and ultimately over who controls information, 
who has access to it, and who will reap the benefits of the information age.  The 
expansion of the Internet can lead to worldwide technological innovations in the areas 
of agricultural output, energy efficiency, medical improvements, and economic 
development through unprecedented data analysis and communications on all levels.  
The opposite, however, is also true.  The power of information, if held tightly by political 
1 "Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media." 03 October 2013. Freedom House. 




                                                          
elites and their families, can also have a repressive effect and lead to an ill-informed 
public and can thwart innovation and development.  Furthermore, a splintering of the 
Internet would create highly isolated, restricted, and regulated domains, each reflecting 
the values and culture of those who govern these domains.     
The Internet status quo has been and still is beneficial to global economic 
development.  The expansion of the Internet has led to economic expansion in 
developing nations at the rate of eight percent per year.2  This growth is expected to 
continue to swell with the advent of the Internet of Things.  As a result, information is 
power now more than ever.  Information, coupled with ease of access, has the potential 
to advance humanity through economic, scientific, and technological development.  
Metadata can be used to enhance this progress, but also can be used to piece together 
a clear picture of an individual's social, religious, political, sexual, medical, financial, and 
educational background, enabling identification and the suppression of certain 
groups.  Likewise, cyber espionage enables a quantitative theft of IP information and 
data that was unimaginable thirty years ago.  Who possesses this information, and the 
means collect it, is important, as this determines the recipients of information 
power.  When information power lies in the hands of the government, government 
elites benefit.  When this power is in the hands of the people, innovation and privacy 
rights increase, as does the ability for citizens to keep governments accountable.   
2 Boston Consulting Group. "The Connected World: The Internet Economy in the G-20." BCG. March 2012. 




                                                          
China’s efforts to censor and manipulate information internal to China require a 
massive government apparatus whose roots spread to every aspect of human 
expression in China.  Selective recounting of historical events, and a careful crafting of 
the accomplishments of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), have contrived a state 
spawned nationalism aimed at boosting CCP legitimacy and stability.  This paper 
analyzes the origins and repercussions of China’s state-led nationalism, while comparing 
and contrasting it with the more organic citizen-led bottom-up nationalism.  While both 
sets of citizens work for the dream of a strong China, the citizens molded by CCP 
propaganda are angry and volatile, which is potentially destabilizing for U.S.-China policy 
as well as for the CCP regime.  The bottom-up nationalists have greater access to 
uncensored global information and are generally a worldlier group.  With honesty and 
justice as their goal, they seek to halt corrosive elements such as domestic 
environmental degradation and leadership corruption, as well as expose perceived 
injustices abroad.  They pursue both goals with equal passion.  It is in the interest of the 
United States to understand both sides of this phenomenon and recognize the areas of 
advantage and disadvantage. 
The second chapter of this paper brings to light the lack of trust initiated by 
China’s aggressive and massive cyber espionage and sabotage of foreign networks.  
Although well documented, China has not yet publically acknowledged these 
digressions.3  These actions are also in opposition to China’s ‘peaceful rise’ policy, 
3 Mandiant Intelligence Center Report. APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units. 02 23, 2013. 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/?gclid=CJas3dDC3LUCFYqk4AodQXMAdg (accessed 02 23, 2013). 
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erecting yet another wall of mistrust.  The recipients of these breaches include 
businesses, U.S. military and government networks, foreign diplomats, dissidents, 
members of groups China deems destabilizing, as well as Western newspapers and 
journalists.  The object is to secure the CCP regime through technological gain, 
asymmetric military capabilities, as well as silencing dissent abroad.  The U.S. national 
security impact is obvious: this is another example of China using control of digital 
networks to stabilize its regime, at the expense of foreign governments, as well as 
domestic and foreign businesses and citizens. 
The final chapter emphasizes the importance of Internet governance, not only 
the ideological and values based concepts of information freedom, but the practical and 
tangible engineering of Internet hardware and software that enables information to 
flow from end to end.  China’s attempts to dislodge the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) leadership from its current Western value based 
leadership are a foreshadowing of the coming battle for the core of the Internet and 
information freedom.  China, by seeking to be a rule maker in the realm of Internet 
governance, aims to alter the frictionless information culture of the Internet by gaining 
advantage over engineering functions at the technical core of the Internet’s computing 
hardware and software.  This would influence the Internet’s global structure, and the 
very nature of communications and information flow.  These actions pry the power of 
information out of the hands of the people, and place it in the hands of the 




                                                                                                                                                                             
the global marketplace, individual freedoms, global cooperation and information 
sharing, and global trust.  U.S. policy makers must understand the historical precedent 
for China’s actions, the influence of information control on China’s foreign policy and 
U.S. national security, as well as the global impact of China’s attempts to become a rule 
maker in this realm. 
 One could cast this struggle as a clash of values; the democratic value of 
information freedom versus a long history in China of authoritarian control.  With the 
founding of the digital age, however, much more is at stake.  The web of connections 
inherent in the Internet amplifies both the benefits and the restrictive capabilities of 


















How does China Use its Information Control 
Apparatus to Manipulate Nationalism: Is this an Effective 
Tool in the Chinese Communist Party’s Pursuit of 











Leading scholars agree that nationalism is a tool used by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to rally support during this time of accelerated and 
unpredictable change in China.4  After the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the CCP made 
a concerted effort to encourage pragmatic nationalism as a way to boost faith in a 
troubled system and to hold the country together during its controversial reforms 
towards a capitalistic economy.  Scholars’ opinions deviate on the topic of whether 
today’s nationalistic sentiment is still controlled by the leaders of China through 
education and media propaganda, or whether it is a grassroots, bottom-up 
nationalist movement of netizens over which the government has no control, or 
both.  To answer this question, it is important to look at the top-down government 
controlled nationalism and contrast it with the more emotional and liberal top-
down nationalism.  Does the party have control over these masses of self-organizing 
youths, or can they spark chaos and topple the legitimacy of China’s ruling elite?  Or 
perhaps of more concern: would the CCP make an unwise, un-pragmatic policy 
decision with respect to volatile territorial disputes to appease these youths, placing 
CCP stability before peaceful foreign relations?5  
 This paper studies the origins, as well as the similarities and differences, of 
the top-down state led nationalism and the bottom-up liberal nationalism.  In order 
to understand the nature of China’s nationalism, the mechanics of China’s internal 
4 Wu, Xu. Understanding China's Angry Youth: What Does the Future Hold? Paper, Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 2009. 
Zhao, Suisheng. "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" Journal of Asian Studies, 2009: 131-144. 
Gongxin Xiao, “Superficial, Arrogant Nationalism”  China Security Vol.5 No.3 (2009)p.53-58 
Peter Hayes Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy (Berkley, University of California 
Press,2004)p.101 
5 Recent activities, and strong CCP response, over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea highlights the 
seriousness of this issue. 
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information control, one of the largest expenditures of human and financial capital 
known to man, will be explained.  The CCP attempts to control, cajole, and 
manipulate these simmering sentiments in an attempt to mold public opinion in its 
favor, even as the role and expansiveness of the Internet continues to grow.  Finally, 
the dangers and the opportunities inherent in this nationalist sentiment will be 
analyzed. 
Chinese nationalism is a product of the mixture of national revolution and 
social revolution and is always in a state of flux as it responds to political, economic, 
and social stimuli.  According to Suisheng Zhao, executive director of the Center for 
China- U.S. Cooperation at the Graduate School of International Studies at the 
University of Denver, three types of nationalism have competed with each other in 
the past ninety years of Chinese history: top-down state endorsed nationalism, a 
grassroots bottom-up liberal nationalism, and ethnic nationalism.6  Ethnic 
nationalism, pride in one’s indigenous heritage, pertains to many of China’s non-Han 
minority communities such as Miao, Uyghur, and Tibetan.  Tibetan and Uyghur 
struggles and resistance against CCP suppression are very important topics, and 
deserve rigorous study.  They do not, however, fit the paradigm of state-sponsored 
and grassroots nationalism supportive of a strong China described in this paper, and 
are therefore not included in this discussion. 
To understand Chinese state-sponsored and the more organic bottom-up 
nationalism, one must look at its history, and observe its current evolution.  
Nationalism, as defined by Peter Hayes Gries, is “that aspect of individuals’ self 




                                                          
image that is tied to their nation, together with the value and emotional significance 
they attach to membership in the national community.”7  He points out China’s 
emphasis, in secondary and university history books, of the “one hundred years of 
humiliation” at the hands of Japanese and Western Imperialism as the root of 
victimization and injustice that China’s youth feel today.   
State, or top-down nationalism, encourages loyalty to the communist party through 
education and media.  It is carefully balanced to promote identification with the 
Chinese Communist Party creating  an “I am the CCP” belief.  Criticism of the CCP is 
internalized by China’s citizens as a criticism of themselves, which therefore limits 
their dissent.  It is carefully controlled by the CCP to avoid internal instability and 
temper alienating anti-West rhetoric.8  
China’s bottom-up, or liberal nationalists are concerned with exposing 
injustice, whether that injustice is internal or external.  They can be righteous and 
pro-democracy or vehemently anti-West.  Their beliefs are formed by a mixture of 
China’s education system as well as state-run and foreign media, and they can be 
quite emotional and ill informed.9  The protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989 
were bottom-up nationalists.  They demonstrated for a more open and democratic 
government and a crackdown on corruption, however, they became very defensive 
of their motherland and critical of the West when the West imposed sanctions on 
7Peter Hayes Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy (Berkley, University of California 
Press,2004) p.9  
8 Wu, Xu. Understanding China's Angry Youth: What Does the Future Hold? Paper, Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 2009. 
Brady, Anne Marie and Wang Jintao. "China's Strengthened New Order and the Role of Propaganda." Journal of 
Contemporary China 18, no. 62 (November 2009): 767-788.  
Gries, Peter Hayes. China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy. Berkley: University of California 
Press, 2004.  




                                                          
China post 1989.10  While these youths are liberals on domestic issues, asking for a 
more transparent government as well as freedom of speech and human rights, they 
are state nationalists on international issues, constantly accusing China’s leaders of 
being too lenient on the West in foreign policy matters.   
Suisheng Zhao speaks of the top-down nationalists when he states that the 
nationalist fervor, in its origin, is state-led and largely reactive.  The Chinese leaders 
have used nationalism to rally support, but also realize that without limits and 
restraints, this nationalist sentiment could work against the Communist Party’s 
goals of economic modernization and jeopardize political stability.  He feels the 
government has solid control over the nationalists.11  Stanley Rosen, professor of 
Political Science from the University of California feels the bottom-up nationalists 
also pose no danger to China’s authoritarian regime.  He says they are 
internationalists “strongly affected by global trends.  Likewise, they are pragmatic, 
materialistic, and largely concerned with living the good life and making money.”12  
He says they are desperate to believe in something and are “very willing to make 
sacrifices if they are persuaded that the cause is just.”  As long as there is economic 
growth, these young nationalists firmly support the leaders of China, and will not do 
anything to destabilize China’s strength as a country.13  
10 Zhao, Suisheng. A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism . Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004.p. 25 
11 Zhao, Suisheng. "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" Journal of Asian Studies, 2009: 131-144. 





                                                          
Professor Xu Wu of Arizona State University disagrees with Zhao and Rosen’s 
benign characterization of Chinese nationalism.  He does not specify what kind of 
nationalism he speaks of when he likens nationalism to a double-edged sword, but 
in this case it is “not only a double-edged sword, but there is no handle.  Nobody 
knows when it will hit you, or how damaging it is, that it will hurt you.  Even for the 
CCP itself, it has to find a way to accommodate to this kind of threatening (sic) but 
also it’s a pending danger.”14  Xiao Gongqin of Shanghai Normal University agrees 
that the enthusiasm of nationalism is unpredictable.  He agrees that nationalism is a 
“political resource” that can be employed to rally support for national causes.  “This 
is useful when the country is threatened or when ideology is waning.”  However, he 
warns that when nationalism “gains a hold over the discourse within society, 
radicals may distort any moderate government position as yielding, capitulating or 
even treasonous – even if they are objectively in the interest of the people.  This 
could pose a great challenge to the government’s authority and threaten the 
legitimacy of its rule.”15   
Peter H. Gries, assistant professor of Political Science at the University of 
Colorado, shares this more ominous view of the continuing emergence of top-down 
nationalists of China.  His book, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and 
Diplomacy,  gives detailed accounts of several confrontational nationalist uprisings 
since Tiananmen including the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1999 Belgrade Chinese 
embassy bombing, the Hainan plane incident of 2001, and the anti–Japan protests of 
14 Wu, Xu. Understanding China's Angry Youth: What Does the Future Hold? Paper, Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 2009. 
15 Gongxin Xiao, “Superficial, Arrogant Nationalism”  China Security Vol.5 No.3 (2009)p.53-58 
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2003.  His analysis of the Chinese embassy bombing by NATO allies and the 2001 
collision of an American EP-3 surveillance aircraft and a Chinese F-8 jet fighter is 
accompanied with imagery of angry Chinese youth carrying banners with degrading 
rhetoric towards the United States.  In one photo after the 1999 embassy bombing, a 
youth is shown dripping with fake blood wearing a headband with the Chinese 
characters for “blood debt” emblazoned in red paint.  The language is clear:  an eye 
for an eye.  It is a cry to force the United States to return the debt of Chinese life…in 
blood.16  The spy plane collision of 2001 also played to the “victim” paradigm in 
which China is the innocent and The United States is the perpetrator.  This evoked 
strong anti-American sentiment protests, as well as denunciation of China’s leaders 
for being soft on America.17 
While the United States asserts the bombing was a mistake, the Chinese 
people overwhelmingly believe the incident was purposefully planned to test the 
Chinese government’s resolve and to humiliate China.  Emails to the Guangming 
Daily, which lost three journalists in the Belgrade bombing, spoke forcefully in favor 
of military action:  “Everyone; contribute money to buy an aircraft carrier”;  “When 
we have a strong and modern military, we’ll see who dares to bully us “; and “The 
Chinese people cannot be insulted”.18 The plane collision, likewise, aroused strong 
anti-American sentiment, protests, as well as denunciation of China’s government 
for being soft on America (mostly due to Chinese media presentation of the event).  
16 Peter H. Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy (Berkeley,University of California 
press,2004)99 
17 Gries book p.101 
18 Ibid 108 
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Raised on a steady diet of history books depicting China “victimized” by the West, 
these two scenarios play to the “victim” paradigm.19     
A recap of bottom-up and top-down nationalist characteristics: 
The bottom-up nationalists are patriotic and love China, but are not angry 
and resentful unless provoked.  They seek justice and political reform in China, 
especially in the areas of political corruption and environmental policy.  They are 
defensive when they feel China has been unfairly criticized and push for strong 
foreign policy when China’s reputation is a stake.  They seem to be influenced by 
state education as well as their experiences, media from multiple sources 
worldwide, and traditional Chinese values.   
A hardworking, well-educated middle-class Chinese youth in an upwardly 
mobile country seeks information for multiple venues (not always informed 
by factual sources) equally disillusioned by constant U.S. post 1989 criticism 
and Chinese corruption and environmental degradation seeks righteousness 
wherever injustice is perceived. 
 The top-down nationalists are larger in number.  They are influenced by 
Chinese propaganda, and they believe in a strong China.  They watch state run 
television and spend more time on the Internet than the more tolerant bottom-
up nationalists20.  The influence of these nationalists starts with the hawkish 
leaders of the Communist Chinese Party Propaganda Department (CCPPC), who 
are responsible for the creation and spread of state propaganda.  This includes 
every imaginable source of human expression in China, to include education, the 
Internet, movies, publications, art exhibits etc..  This environment of propaganda 
forms a citizen who is resentful of past humiliations suffered by China, and as a 
result, they pressure for an aggressive foreign policy.  Aggressive nationalist 
sentiment, in turn, supports the hawkish creators of CCP propaganda, forming a 
self-supporting circle. 
Hawkish CCPPD leaders historical victim narrative state propaganda top-
down nationalists with resentment toward West and Japan aggressive 
foreign policy patronage support for hawkish CCP leaders support for 
victim paradigm narrative propaganda  repeat 
19 Ibid 101 
20 Woods, Jackson S and Bruce J Dickson. Victims and Patriots: Disaggregating Nationalism in China. presentation. 




                                                          
Who are China’s nationalists? 
China’s nationalists are China’s post 1989 generation raised on an 
educational diet of victim narrative.  They are young, college educated, bright, and 
technologically shrewd.  They are also the prince and princesses of China’s “one 
child per family” policy.  In China’s post-Communist ideology economic powerhouse, 
they are searching for something to believe in and for a way to make their 
generational mark.  They are unified in their desire to hunt down injustices, foreign 
or domestic, perceived or factual, and expose them.  Since the Tiananmen incident, 
these youths have repeatedly heeded the Chinese Communist Party’s warnings and 
stepped back from the brink of chaos, yet they could still pose a possible danger to 
the stability of the current governing regime, as well as to China-U.S. relations.  The 
fear is that due to their elevated passion for their causes, ability to organize through 
the Internet, and shear mass in numbers, they could cause a mob mentality 
ideological attack directed toward a foreign or domestic target.  The CPP has greatly 
expanded its internal information control structure, strengthening its ability to 
block, censor, and manipulate Internet content, to control this group. 
In the Chinese media, they are frequently maligned as the spoiled, self-centered 
“me generation”.  They are the product of the second generation of the “one child 
per family” policy, in which one child is the sole focus six adults: two sets of doting 
grandparents and a pair of devoted parents.  Sensitive to global trends, they are 
largely concerned with living the good life and making money.  Many are members 
of the establishment who have greatly benefitted from China’s economic successes.  
As they struggle for an identity that measures up to the importance given them 
9 
 
growing up, they show rebellion, cynicism, an obsession for equality and a support 
for the underdog.  They are desperate to believe in something and are “very willing 
to make sacrifices if they are persuaded that the cause is just.”21  Their tireless 
efforts and partnership with Chinese students studying abroad raised huge funds 
for those affected by the Sichuan earthquake in the spring of 2008.  Afterward, they 
worked to expose the corrupt misappropriation of those funds by local government 
officials.22  They displayed their passions and extreme anti-American sentiment in 
the 1999 protests against the NATO allied bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade, as well as protested in opposition to the United States stance on the 2001 
spy plane collision.  More recently, in the nationalist book Unhappy China released 
in the spring of 2009,  they call for a more critical foreign policy stance toward the 
West, and to “incorporate retribution and punishment into our diplomatic 
strategies” when dealing with the West.23  The book warns, “America will face a less 
friendly China in the future”.24 
After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, the CCP made a concerted effort to 
encourage nationalism as a way to boost faith in a troubled political system and to 
hold the country together during the rapid and uncertain economic reforms.  An 
important aspect of the belief system, supported by the country’s post 1989 history 
curriculum, is the victim paradigm education model, emphasizing the injustices of 
21 Stanley Rosen, “Contemporary Chinese Youth and the State”, Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 68, No 2 (May) 2009. 
P.361 
22 Kaifu, Lee, “Understanding China’s “Angry Youth”: What Does the Future Hold?”(Paper presented at The 
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.,USA, April 29,2009) p.13 
18 Qi Fu “Book Unhappy China stirs controversy” Shanghai Daily,  March 27, 2009  
(http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/2009/200903/20090327/article_395564.htm 
24 Jason Dean. “Book Stokes Nationalism in China”. The Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2009 A18 
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Western and Japanese Imperialism.25  Many young people feel that not supporting 
the CCP in righting these past humiliations, and in strengthening economic growth, 
is opposing their very identity as Chinese.26   
It is important to emphasize that these nationalists are not merely 
brainwashed mouthpieces of the Chinese leadership, but also a grassroots, bottom-
up movement.27  They are well informed and cognizant of the limits the CCP tries to 
place on them.  Tang Jie, a 29-year-old Chinese cyber-nationalist living in Shanghai, 
says he is perplexed by the Western belief that Chinese youth are naïve about their 
government’s censorship.  On the contrary, he feels that “Because we are in such a 
system, we are always asking ourselves whether we are brainwashed, we are always 
eager to get information from different channels.”  He adds, “When you are in a so 
called free system you never think about whether you are being brainwashed.”28  
These youths are creative free thinkers who have no qualms about creating a way 
around “The Great Firewall of China” which is viewed more as an irritation than a 
barrier.  They are able to connect to blocked sites through overseas proxy servers as 
well as receive foreign news clips from overseas Chinese, expanding their ability to 
receive many viewpoints.29   
Tang Jie is a Ph.D. student in Western philosophy at the prominent Fudan 
University in Shanghai.  He has extensive knowledge of and access to Western 
media, speaks and reads German and English fluently and daily reads a variety of 
25 Peter Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy (Berkeley, University of California 
Press,2004)101 
26 Gongqin Xiao, “Superficial, Arrogant Nationalism” China Security Vol.5 No.3 (2009)  
    Suisheng Zhao. “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?”  Washington Quarterly 29.1 (2005)p.132 
27 Xu Wu “Understanding China’s “Angry Youth”: What Does the Future Hold?”(Paper presented at The 
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.,USA, April 29,2009)78 




                                                          
American and European on-line news sources.  In April 2008, moved by what he felt 
was a betrayal by the Western media in its portrayal of human rights violations in 
Tibet during Beijing’s Olympic preparations, Tang Jie used images from Western and 
domestic news outlets to make a video called “China Stand Up” and posted it on 
sina.com; it went viral. Tang Jie, well versed in the CCP’s manipulation of the news to 
further party goals, believes Western media does the same.  He is ceratin Western 
media alters information to spur anti-Chinese sentiment and halt China’s climb to 
world power status.  The video details perceived bias in the coverage of Tibetan 
riots, exposing cropped CNN photos that eliminate the violent Tibetan element in a 
photo of a beaten monk.  In another image, a disabled Chinese athlete clutches the 
Olympic torch to her body for fear European protesters will rip it from her bosom: a 
poignant image of the powerful West attempting to subdue the humble, innocent, 
yet proud China.30   
In an effort to understand top-down versus bottom-up nationalism, in 2011 
Peter Gries conducted a survey study to determine what, if any, effect state 
sponsored propaganda had on Chinese nationalism.  His study found China’s top-
down nationalism, which fosters a sense of resentment or superiority and 
engenders difficult relations with other countries, is connected to state sponsored 
propaganda.  However, state propaganda is not the sole influence on nationalism.  
The bottom-up liberal nationalism is at its core a feeling of pride in China’s 
accomplishments rather than anger at foreign powers.  These youths are moved by 
30 Jie, Tang. "2008! ChinaStandUp! 2008." YouTube. August 2008. 




                                                          
famous writers like Hanhan, or the artist Ai Weiwei.  Like Tang Jie in Osnos’ New 
Yorker article, they look beyond the “Great Firewall of China”and are well informed 
and worldly.  In his surveys, he found these two sentiments do not intersect.  They 
are ideologically and empirically independent of each other.  31   According to this 
study, the state propaganda system has little influence on the opinions of these 
young, cynical liberal nationalists.  Those who are influenced by the propaganda 
state are more likely to resent the power of stronger nations, harbor resentment 
and anger toward other countries, and believe China is a superior country.32  In 
America, those who are proud to be American largely overlap with those that 
believe America has the right to force its policies on other sovereign countries.  This 
is not true in China.  In China, a love of one’s country and pride in one’s culture and 
country’s historical achievements is a separate sentiment from the more volatile 
and acrimonious state-sponsored nationalism. 
 
Should the Chinese nationalists be of Concern to the United States? 
Research has shown bottom-up nationalism, while emotional and 
unpredictably focused, does not seek aggressive policy.  These individuals do not 
seek to harm the West, but rather seek to right perceived wrongs.  The top-down 
nationalists, however, are grounded in resentment and anger.  The Communist Party 
31 Gries, Peter, Michael Crowson, Huajian Cai, and Qingmin Zhang. "Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US 
Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National identity." The China Quarterly, 2011: 1-17. 
Woods, Jackson S, and Bruce J Dickson. Victims and Patriots: Disaggregating Nationalism in China. presentation, 
Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2012.p.27 
 
32Gries, Peter, Michael Crowson, Huajian Cai, and Qingmin Zhang. "Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy: 




                                                          
sponsored victim paradigm creates Chinese nationalists who choose stories with 
heroic victory.  They choose bravado over cool-headed discourse.  Gries asserts, “It 
would be a mistake to attribute to the Communist Party complete control over 
Chinese nationalism today.  With the emergence of the Internet, cell phones, and 
text messaging, popular nationalists in China are increasingly able to act 
independently of the state.”33  Gries feels that protesting youths limited China’s 
policy options during the spy plane collision and the Chinese embassy bombing in 
Belgrade.  Others noted that in negotiating in Beijing, American diplomats “saw a 
Chinese government acutely sensitive to Chinese public opinion.”34  “Such 
sensitivities are only likely to increase.  Western policymakers ignore how this new 
factor affects Chinese policy at their own peril.”35  
This perception, of course, is of concern when America’s candid and 
occasionally blundering ways are misconstrued as an attempt to humiliate or attack 
China.  It could also be a danger to the legitimacy of China’s leaders.  “Let the next 
nationalist protests spin out of control, and the party could become a target of 
popular criticism, whether for failing to uphold China’s national dignity, or 
corruption, or social justice.  If the party should resort to force to suppress 
nationalist protesters, it could receive a mortal blow.  Either scenario could lead to 
33Gries, Peter. ‘Chinese Nationalism: Challenging the State?’ Current History September 2005. P. 254 
    Grammaticas, Damian. "China's Rising Nationalism Troubles West." BBC News. November 17, 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/8363260.stm (accessed December 13, 2013). 
Interview with China hand and former Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State in the Bureau of East Asia and 
Pacific Affairs, Susan Shirk  
 
34Keefe, John. Anatomy of the EP-3 Incident. Alexandria, Va: CNA Corporation, 2002.p. 10 
35 Gries book p. 134 
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regime change.  Each seeks to use each other to achieve their goals, but is also 
fearful of the threat each represents to their own survival.”36  
 
Can the CCP Control the Nationalists? 
Top-down nationalism is state-sponsored and is effective in encouraging 
support for the CCP one party system, or appeals to those who already support the 
CCP.  The primary CCP bureaucracy in charge of disseminating state propaganda is 
the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department (CCPPD), which organizes a 
huge and far-reaching system of information propagation and censorship.  The 
CCPPD has been effective in garnering support for CCP policy, especially in the cases 
of the embassy bombing in Belgrade, and the Hainan island air collision incident.  
Chinese leaders were able to rally anti-Western sentiment, but were also able to 
control the size, place, and timing of the anti-West protests.  Anne Marie Brady in 
her book “Marketing Dictatorship” says that after the Belgrade Chinese Embassy 
bombing by the United States, thousands of Beijing students were bussed to protests 
in Beijing by CCP buses, and then bussed back for a hot meal on campus.37 
When Chinese youths asked for the boycott of French products due to 
France’s support the Dalai Lama in the pre-Olympic spring of 2008, the Government 
blocked news videos of the protests.  A search for information turned up a blank 
page explaining that such web pages “do not conform to relevant law and policy”.  
When people poured into the streets to protest the accidental embassy bombing, 
36 Gries, Current History p.256 
37 Brady, Anne-Marie. Marketing Dictatorship. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,Inc., 2008.p. 54 
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China tolerated the protests for the first few days, but then feared they would 
irreparably damage China-US relations.  They appealed to the students’ patriotism 
by reporting in the People’s Daily that the protests were hurting the Chinese 
economy by keeping tourists home and limiting foreign investment.  The protesters 
went home.38  In 2005 when students were organizing a large May 4th 
demonstration, the Party inundated cell phone users with messages warning against 
spreading rumors, believing rumors or illegally protesting.39  Several of the online 
organizers were arrested by police to keep full control.40 
The bottom-up nationalists are less influence by China’s propaganda machine, 
and therefore less malleable.  Although not stated, Mike Lampton is probably 
referring to the bottom-up nationalists when he expressed that the state 
constructed victim scenario in Chinese nationalism is changing.  He feels they are 
thinking less about past wrongs and more about China’s national goals.41  Lee Kaifu, 
former vice president of Google in China, sees great potential in the Chinese 
nationalists.  They are bright, passionate and want their voice heard.  They stood up 
against corruption and plagiarism in academics by setting up a website to expose 
professors who were not writing their own works.  After the Sichuan earthquake, 
the nationalist youths worked with Google to set-up a database of all cities in need 
and connected donors and supplies with those who needed them.  Rightly or 
38 Zhao, China Security p.55 
39 “China guards Japanese Embassy amid public anger,”  International Herald Tribune, May 4,2005,  
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/04/asia/web.0504china.php 
40 Zhao, China Security p.56 
41 Mike Lampton, “The Political Dynamics of Chinese Nationalism”  Carnegie Endowment for Peace symposium, 
December 7, 2004  
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wrongly, they also exposed those wealthy individuals who did not donate to the 
cause.42 The New York Times calls this growing phenomenon online vigilantism.43  
In online vigilantism, lessons in morality are enforced by anonymous online 
users who are self-proclaimed police, jury, and judge.44  The CCP is sensitive to this 
crowd mentality activity, which draws parallels to the activities of the Cultural 
Revolution.  As a result, the government has blocked Twitter, tightened controls on 
search engines, and employed text message surveillance technology to scan text 
messages for “key words”.45  The CCP has claimed these measures are to block 
access to pornography, but has also admitted the measures are to stop destabilizing 
elements in society. 
 
How Does China Control Information? 
One cannot truly comprehend the persistence of and the domination over 
China’s citizens until one understands the enormity of China’s information control 
and manipulation abilities.  The information control system, which includes 
propaganda, manipulation, and censorship, is a huge apparatus largely under the 
control of the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department (CCPPD).  
Propaganda responsibilities include newspaper offices, radio stations, TV stations, 
publishing houses, magazines, news and media departments, universities, middle 
schools, elementary schools, cadre training, musical troupes, theatrical troupes, film 
42 Lee Kaifu, , “Understanding China’s “Angry Youth”: What Does the Future Hold?”(Paper presented at The 
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., USA, April 29, 2009 
43 Howard French, “Online Throngs Impose a Stern Morality in China” The New York Times, June 3, 2006 
44 NYT Ibid 




                                                          
production, literature and art troupes, cultural amusement parks, cultural palaces, 
libraries, remembrance halls, museums and other cultural facilities and 
commemorative exhibition facilities.46 
Here is a breakdown of the Central Propaganda Department of China: 
• The State Council Information Office (SCIO) or Guowuyuan 
Xinwenban.  Monitors news nationwide 
• The Ministry of Culture (MOC) or Wenhua Bu.  Monitors theater, 
literature, museum activities, and artistic endeavors. 
• The Ministry of Education (MOE) or Jiaoyu Bu.  Monitors primary 
school, secondary school, and university textbooks and curriculum.  
• The Ministry of Information Industry (MII) or Xinxi Chanye Bu, the 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) or Gong’an Bu, the Ministry of State 
Security (MSS) or Guojia Anquan Bu.  These all have joint authority to 
respectively observe and or block electronic communications into 
China.  The MPS and MSS monitor electronic communications, 
whereas the MII is responsible for monitoring the actual technical 
components of the communications infrastructure such as fiber optic 
cables and telephone lines as well as radio bandwidth and frequencies 
• The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department 
Third and Fourth Departments block satellite communications and 
shortwave broadcasts. 
• The PLA General Political Department (GPD) organizes and 
disseminates military propaganda. 
• The State Council General Administration of Press and 
Publications (GAPP) or Xinwen Chuban Zongju, monitors the 
publishing houses. 
• The CCPPD and the State Council Information Office supervises 




The following CCP document listed the various forms of illegal Internet content: 
”The Decision of the National People's Congress Standing Committee on 
Guarding Internet Security, Regulations on Telecommunications of the 
People's Republic of China, Measures on the Administration of Internet 
46Shambaugh, David. "China's Propaganda System, Institutions, Processes and Efficacy." The China Journal (The 
University of Chicago Press), January 2007. P.28 
Taken from The Encyclopedia on the Building of the CCP (Chengdu:Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1992) p.676 
47 Shambaugh, David. "China's Propaganda System, Instutions, Processes and Efficacy." The China Journal (The 
University of Chicago Press), January 2007: p.30-31 
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Information Services, Measures on the Administration of Security Protection 
of the International Networking of Computer Information Networks, and 
other laws and regulations clearly prohibit the spread of information that 
contains contents subverting state power, undermining national unity, 
infringing upon national honor and interests, inciting ethnic hatred and 
secession, advocating heresy, pornography, violence, terror and other 
information that infringes upon the legitimate rights and interests of others. 
According to these regulations, basic telecommunication business operators 
and Internet information service providers shall establish Internet security 
management systems and utilize technical measures to prevent the 
transmission of all types of illegal information.”48 
 
China’s massive propaganda campaign elicits control over all aspects of 
human creative expression.  The above publication shows that China stringently 
controls all Internet communications as well.  According to Freedom on the Net 
2013, China is one of the top three most Internet restrictive countries in the world.49  
China has an elaborate censorship technological apparatus and employs two million 
humans to wade through millions of messages on social media sites and 
microblogging sites and police the internet.50  Some are trained on multi-million 
dollar software to aid in problematic comment detection.51  Final censorship 
decisions are made not by them, but by officials employed by the state, or by the 
48 (新媒体蓝皮书<中国新媒体发展报告(2010). Xin Meiti Lanpishu "Zhongguo Xin Meiti Fazhan Baogao (2010)". 
New Media Blue Book,"China New Media Development Report (2010)") 
49 "Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media." Freedom House. October 03, 
2013. http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202013_Full%20Report_0.pdf (accessed 
12 04, 2013)p.19 
50Hunt, Katie, and CY Xu. "China Employs 2 Million to Police Internet." CNN. October 07, 2013. 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/07/world/asia/china-internet-monitors/?hpt=hp_t2 (accessed December 04, 
2013).  
新京报. 网络舆情分析师：要做的不是删帖. 03 10 2013. http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2013-
10/03/content_469152.htm?div=-1. 01 05 2014. 
BBC. China Employs Two Million Microblog Monitors State Media Says. 04 10 2013. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24396957. 01 05 2014. 
51 (新媒体蓝皮书<中国新媒体发展报告(2010). Xin Meiti Lanpishu "Zhongguo Xin Meiti Fazhan Baogao (2010)". 
New Media Blue Book,"China New Media Development Report (2010)") 
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microblogging and social media sites themselves.  These censors or monitors are 
looking for comments that might incite collective action.52 
 One can break this Internet control down into three systems.  The first is 
automated technical control systems, more commonly known as the “Great 
Firewall” of China.  The second is forced self-censorship, and the final technique is 
proactive manipulation.53 The Firewall blocks websites, and engages in 
“webthrottling”, which slows access to a standstill.54  The Firewall blocks are easily 
administered because there are only eight information gateways in and out of 
China.55  Deep packet inspection technologies are another aspect of the Firewall.  
These technologies look for keywords, and can find specific pages on a website, or 
comments on a social media site, and delete them (or sever the connection) while 
leaving the other content on the site alone.  This is the main way China’s largest cell 
phone providers (China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom) censor content, 
through automated technical keyword filtering.  Frequently, censored material can 
still be viewed by the author, but no one else, deceiving the author into thinking his 
post can be read by others.56  Knowledge of these methods of information control 
leads to self-censoring.  In an effort to avoid detection, or to find the information 
52 King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Molly Roberts. "American Political Science Review." How Censorship Allows 
Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. n.d. 
http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/censored.pdf (accessed 02 20, 2013). (King, Pan and Roberts n.d.) 
53 (Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media)p194,  (MacKinnon 2012)p.35-
38 
54 (Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media)p194 
55 (MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom)p.35 
56 (Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media)p.197 
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desired, Chinese netizens think of creative ways to express themselves by use of 
homophones, sarcasm, and nuance.57 
The second method is forced self-censorship by service providers to comply 
with CCP regulations.  In this way, the private sector is directly involved in and 
assists in the censorship of information in China.  Service providers must censor 
banned content or lose their license, and thus are the first line of internal 
censorship.  These companies use software to look for blacklisted keywords, as well 
as use human censors to sift through posts looking for unwanted content.  Baidu is a 
Chinese search engine used for eighty percent of all searches in China.  It uses 
software to seek out prohibited terms, but also manipulates search results to 
comply with government protocol.  This causes state sanctioned news and 
information to come up first, while foreign sources are removed or pushed far back.  
Foreign companies also comply with these regulations to reap the financial 
benefits of the huge Chinese market.58  The Chinese government expects them to 
“protect” Chinese citizens through censorship while also revealing online users’ 
personal information when asked.  In 2004, Yahoo, at the request of the CCP, 
relinquished email content and IP addresses of dissidents, which led to their 
arrest.59  Clearly, an effort to structure a set of norms, or codes of conduct, must 
begin to protect freedom of speech as well as political and religious expression. 
57 Link, Perry. "China: Capitulate or Things Will Get Worse." The New York Review of Books. October 24, 2013. 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/oct/24/china-capitulate-or-things-will-get-worse/ 
(accessed December 04, 2013).  
58 (Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media)p.196-197 
59 Human Rights Watch. "How Multinational Internet Companies Assist Government Censorship in China." 




                                                          
Information control is not only achieved through censorship of terms and 
websites, but also through hardware and software.  Technology companies can 
write code or build networks that determine how information is organized, 
assessed, or disseminated.  US companies such as Websense, Blue Coat, Palo Alto 
Networks, McAfee, and Smartfilter all create software that is used to block 
pornography and other inappropriate content for youths.  This same software can 
aid authoritarian governments in general censorship.  Cisco promotes products in 
China, which it knows will be used to thwart human rights.  Their routers are used 
in the construction of China’s “Firewall”.60   
The third method of information control is proactive manipulation.  The CCP 
employs Internet monitors to guide conversations online, and post government 
sanctioned opinion.  The “Wumaodang”, or fiftycent party, are humans paid (fifty 
Chinese cents per comment; about six US cents) by the CCP to spam comment 
spaces on social media with CCP propaganda.  These comments are easily 
recognizable for their contrived prose.  More nuanced are the trained online 
propagandists who mold online conversation, and even change news facts to calm 
online tensions.  Although, Rebecca MacKinnon believes most Chinese do not know 
the extent to which they are censored,61some believe the increasingly sophisticated 
Chinese netizen is aware of this, and these methods may actually be working to 
decrease confidence in online content.62 
60 (MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom)p171 
61 (MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom)p.39 
62Link, Perry. "China: Capitulate or Things Will Get Worse." The New York Review of Books. October 24, 2013.   
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Since Mao founded the PRC this vast control apparatus, which requires such 
huge amounts of human and financial capital, has been expanding.  The tactics have 
changed, but the goal is the same: control the masses and stay on top.  In the months 
following Xi Jinping’s ascendance to president, news has been rife with examples of 
information crackdowns.  Even though Mao’s actions were manipulative, ruthless, 
and without empathy, to this day, in China, there is little accountability for his 
actions.  In preparation for Mao’s 120th birthday, recent Chinese newspapers articles 
have called the famine during the Great Leap Forward “a rumor”.63  Twenty to forty 
million people are thought to have died during this period, for reasons directly 
related to Mao’s policies.  Because China’s education system does not present a 
factual account of modern Chinese history and continues to misrepresent or 
overlook much evidence, China’s leaders are still not accountable for their actions.  
They are driven by “political imperatives” rather than factual experience.64  This 
manipulation of facts and far reaching propaganda fuels Chinese nationalism, and 
distracts China’s citizens from the chronic problems of corruption, pollution, and 
inequity.  Chinese instead focus their dissatisfaction on the evils of the West, past 
victimization, or pride in China’s increasing military might.  Lastly, China spends an 
exorbitant amount of money on “stability maintenance”, to include the millions 
spent to monitor the Internet, manipulate online content, and censor incoming 
information from all corners of the world.  Internal security spending in China is 
63Buckley, Chris. "Milder Accounts of Hardships Under Mao Arise as His Birthday Nears." New York Times. October 16, 
2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/world/asia/advancing-a-milder-version-of-maos-calamities.html?_r=0 




                                                          
growing faster than military spending.65  In 2013, China’s domestic security 
spending budget expanded to $124 billion USD, and exceeded military spending for 
the third year in a row.66  According to Chinese state media, there are two million 
people working to police the Internet.  That is more than the published number of 
1.5 million active military personnel in China.67  In addition to the billions spent to 
“harmonize” Internet content, one cannot ignore the police and security resources 
needed to intimidate or imprison those who cross the blurred line of what 
communications’ content is deemed inappropriate. 
Fed a diet of CCP propaganda from cradle to grave, the Chinese are oblivious 
to the omissions in their history curriculum.  They do not learn about the 1959 
famine brought about by Mao’s Great Leap Forward, or the mechanics of 
globalization.  This gilded cage of propaganda all too easily convinces the Chinese 
population the West is their enemy.68 
Xi Jinping’s regime so far is a disappointment to those who hoped for greater 
political and social reform.  He has tightened free expression and censorship 
resulting in loss of jobs for outspoken professors, the detention of philanthropists 
65 Wall Street Journal. "Internal Security Tops Military in China Spending." China Real Time. May 05, 2011. 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/03/05/internal-security-tops-military-in-china-spending/ (accessed 
12 05, 2013). 
66MacLeod, Calum. "China Boosts Military and Domestic Security Spending." USA Today. March 05, 2013. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/03/05/china-party-congress-military/1964405/ 
(accessed December 13, 2013).  
67 Hunt, Katie, and CY Xu. "China Employs 2 Million to Police Internet." CNN. October 07, 2013. 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/07/world/asia/china-internet-monitors/?hpt=hp_t2 (accessed December 04, 
2013). 
 
68 Link, Perry. "China: Capitulate or Things Will Get Worse." The New York Review of Books. October 24, 2013. 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/oct/24/china-capitulate-or-things-will-get-worse/ 




                                                          
and dissidents, as well as heightened media censorship.69  Recent headlines of 
President Xi’s oppressive measures to consolidate power have been numerous.  His 
crusade to crack down on Internet content, wayward scholars, dissidents, and 
freedom of the press belies a fear of instability, and once again shows the CCP‘s 
flexibility and resilience in its fight to stay in power.  A return to Mao tactics, this 
crackdown “Is about controlling the masses effectively by controlling their thinking 
and ambitions”.70  These feared youths, who are the object of massive CCP human 
and monetary resources, have little more than “the power to tell unapproved 
truths”.71  The media was flooded by such articles in the months of September and 
October of 2013.  In late August numerous popular bloggers were detained or 
arrested, some under trumped-up charges unrelated to Internet content.  Charles 
Xue is an American businessman of Chinese descent who was arrested for having 
sex with a prostitute.  He is also a very popular micoblogger with over 12 million 
registered followers who is openly critical of Chinese officials when he sees fit.  
Microblogs have given people such as Charles Xue a far-reaching and influential 
position.  Many have become famous, making big sums of money from their fame.  
Obviously, the CCP finds this worrisome.72  Likewise, a well-known and wealthy 
69 Huang, Gary. "Xi Jinping Goes Back to the Future to Strengthen Party Control." SCMP. 11 14, 2013. 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1310566/xi-jinping-goes-back-future-strengthen-party-control 
(accessed 11 14, 2013). 
 
70Huang, Cary. "Xi Jinping Goes Back to the Future to Strengthen Party Control." South China Morning Post. 09 
16, 2013. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1310566/xi-jinping-goes-back-future-strengthen-party-
control (accessed 12 05, 2013).Quoted:Steve Tsang, head of China Policy Institute of the University of 
Nottingham 
71Link, Perry."How to Deal With the Chinese Police." THe New York Review of Books. November 07, 2013. 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/nov/07/how-deal-chinese-police/ (accessed December 05, 
2013). 
72Buckley, Chris. "Crackdown on Bloggers Is Mounted by China." New York Times. September 10, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/asia/china-cracks-down-on-online-opinion-makers.html?_r=0 
(accessed November 11, 2013). 
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businessman, Mr. Wang Gongquan, was arrested in October  2013.  He was unusual 
in that he used his extreme wealth to champion controversial causes, such as the 
residential system in cities which restrict immigrant children from attending school 
in the cities where their parents work.  Mr. Wang’s arrest is a deterrent to other 
wealthy people in China who may also want to use their money towards “political” 
causes.73  As part of the same crackdown, Professor Xia Yeling, an economist at 
Beijing University, was dismissed because of his support for free markets and 
democracy.74  These are only the high profile cases.  Countless other citizens were 
no doubt detained,  “invited to tea” or otherwise intimidated by the Chinese special 
police.  Buddhist monks in China and Tibet have also brought to light increasingly 
restrictive and intrusive surveillance.75 
These crackdowns have been coupled with bold economic reforms (Deng 
Xiaoping did the same thing in the 1990’s).76  Xi’s crackdown on national corruption, 
or the purge of “tigers and flies”, however, is conspicuously one-sided in who it 
targets.  Critics of Xi’s policies are arrested, where as his supporters are left in office.  
Xi’s “ideological rectification campaign” harkens back to Mao; the enemy is 
democracy, freedom, and constitutionalism.  According to the Financial Times (and 
supported by the above New York Times articles), several people were arrested in 
73Buckley, Chris. "China Arrests Prominent Businessman Who Backed Rights Causes." New York Times. October 
21, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/world/asia/china-arrests-prominent-businessman-who-
backed-rights-causes.html (accessed December 06, 2013). 
74 The Editorial Board. "Beijing's Assault on Academic Freedom." The New York Times. October 21, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/opinion/beijings-assault-on-academic-freedom.html (accessed 
December 06, 2013). 
75 Levin, Dan. "Tibetan Monks Describe a Web of Unseen Controls." New York Times. October 24, 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/25/world/asia/tibetan-monks-describe-a-web-of-unseen-controls.html 
(accessed December 04, 2013). 
76 Wall Street Journal Opinion. "In Deng Xiaoping's Footsteps." Wall Street Journal. November 18, 2013. 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303985504579205461454963626 (accessed 
December 06, 2013). 
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China in September 2013 solely because they were critical of the CCP.77  This 
contradicts Gary King’s assertion that China is solely interested in thwarting 
collective action, not criticism of the government, unless the CCP fears the star 
power of these famous public figures can draw masses of people.  It seems likely, 
however, that President Xi Jinping is not only interested in suppressing protesters; 
he is eliminating or intimidating his opponents while sending a firm message to like-
minded citizens: Criticize at your own risk. 
Chinese leaders’ true motives and objectives are opaque; any analysis of 
recent events requires skilled guesswork.  One can be certain, however, that 
President Xi Jinping is working hard to consolidate power and ease out detractors of 
all forms.  He is the “princeling” son of a former Politburo member and communist 
veteran Xi Zhongxun, which has given him credibility with the military and 
increased support in the upper reaches of Chinese leadership.  Perhaps Xi feels a 
need to champion the conservatives in his early days of presidency to avoid a power 
grab.  He may feel the West’s constant pressure for civil rights, human rights, and 
freedom of speech is a form of ideological warfare deployed to bring down one party 
rule in China.   
One can dismiss these efforts to eliminate dissent as extreme cases.  The 
majority of Chinese are not affected.  Rebecca MacKinnon disagrees.  She is 
concerned about the sweeping nature of how information is controlled in China.  
The firewall blocks unwanted ideas from entering China, but even more insidious is 
77Dikotter, Frank. ""Tiger hunts" revisit a bloody era in China's history." Financial Times. September 13, 2013. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cfbf5d72-1614-11e3-a57d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2miuqOnQb (accessed 
December 06, 2013). 
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the management of political discourse within China.  Lively online discourse is 
allowed by the CCP as long as it does not allude to or spark mass protest.  The 
government, now aware of the grievance, addresses the discontent and steers the 
conversation to highlight positive progress, all while deleting inflammatory 
comments.  The netizens feel satisfied to have contributed to the political sphere, 
and thus have an increased sense of political freedom.  Nothing, however, really 
changes, apart from the government obtaining more clarity about the grievance of 
the Chinese people.  The CCP then uses this information to manipulate the 
conversation online.78  King, in a detailed report, supports MacKinnon’s theory.  In 
capturing social media comments before they were deleted by CCP censors, King 
found that the censored entries were largely posts that encouraged people to 
assemble.  These posts were both pro-CCP and anti-CCP.  He also noted the guidance 
of online conversation by authorities.79  According to MacKinnon, this increase in 
information manipulation provides a framework for a global loss of information 
freedom.80  
These information structures used to mold human expression also aid in 
creating strong Chinese nationalism, and this can be a danger to peaceful foreign 
policy.  Suisheng Zhao suggests that nationalism rather than communism is the 
78MacKinnon, Rebecca. Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom. New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 2012. P.34 
 
79 King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Molly Roberts. "American Political Science Review." How Censorship Allows 
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http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/censored.pdf (accessed 02 20, 2013).  
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primary ideology of the PRC.  At the very founding of the nation in 1949, Mao 
Zedong addressed China’s citizens using the nationalist expression “the Chinese 
people have stood up ever since”.  The implication is that the Chinese, in forming the 
PRC, have stood up to the wrongs of the past to repair the China’s pride and restore 
China’s rightful place in the world.81  After the disintegration of the USSR China’s 
leaders have reopened this wound of deep resentment over past wrongs to increase 
dedication to the CCP.  Although there is no academic research undeniably proving 
that these top-down nationalists are created by China’s tight web of information 
manipulation and control, it is reasonable to say there is a link.  The information 
control that has nurtured this cynical group also manipulates their opinion by 
limiting the content of China’s news and opinions available.  While Chinese leaders 
can be forceful and arrogant in their rhetoric, they are usually thoughtful in their 
actions.  The CCP has proved to be in control of the nationalist sentiment in the past, 
aptly reining it in when their actions harm business relations.  This CCP constructed 
pressure cooker of contained emotion serves its purpose until there is a hairline 
fracture in the structure, which could result in an explosion. 
Although economic security is the CCP’s primary concern, accidents 
combined with irrational emotions could trigger an escalation.  No one expected a 
suicide by self-immolation to ignite the Arab Spring.  One event can elicit previously 
ignored pent-up emotions.  A news article or CNN photo can arouse feelings of 




                                                          
injustice causing circumstances to escalate.  Today’s world of high-speed 
information flow reduces decision-making time adding to the explosive nature. 
The recent events in the East China Sea have all the ingredients for an 
explosive situation.  China’s creation of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 
blurs the lines between offensive and defensive action. By not notifying neighbors 
beforehand, a new situation has been established without an understanding of 
China’s true objectives, and no time to develop fresh procedures.  Because of US-
China shared economic interests, a war is unlikely to start intentionally.  Rather, it 
will start because of “reactions to maneuver and perceived threats”.82 Add to this 
China’s fear of rising masses, and too many unknowns are added to the problem. 
At first China declared any incursions into the newly declared ADIZ would be 
met with “defensive emergency measures”, but nothing happened after US military 
B-52s entered.83  In response to a Chinese online news article about US B-52s flying 
unannounced into China’s ADIZ, Chinese netizens were furious the Chinese Defense 
Ministry had not taken action against the incursions.  While many comments were 
littered with vulgar language, some were sober in their resolve.  One states, “I don’t 
like war, but I don’t want the sons and daughters of China to be humiliated.  China 
must use force.  With a united population of 1.3 billion, who can face us?”  In a twist 
of thinking, another comment poignantly proffers that the Pentagon’s 
82 Hipple, Matthew. "How War With China Would Start: 99 Red Balloons." War On The Rocks. November 13, 
2013. http://warontherocks.com/2013/11/how-war-with-china-would-start-99-red-balloons/ (accessed 
December 10, 2013). 
83 Page, Jeremy, Jeyup s Kwaak, and Yumi Otagaki. "Concern Mounts in China's Air-Defense Zone." Wall Street 
Journal. November 18, 2013. 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304017204579226031095207724 (accessed 
December 10, 2013). 
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announcement that B-52s entered into ADIZ was a deliberate action to agitate 
Chinese netizen emotion.84  Is it possible the Chinese netizens are being used as 
pawns by both sides?  This interesting question deserves some further study.   
China’s opaque policy decisions make it difficult to understand what its true 
intentions are.  The declaration of the ADIZ was a regionally poor public relations 
choice, as it created a situation for South Korea and Japan to find common ground.  
Furthermore, it left the CCP looking weak to China’s citizens.  The move was no 
doubt to consolidate Xi’s power, but could also be a reflection of internal strife.   
There are many different opposing groups within China’s leadership, but the 
most striking in this conflict is that of the conservatives and the military versus the 
more liberal minded reformers.  Interestingly, these two groups parallel the beliefs 
of the hawkish top-down nationalists and the more worldly bottom-up nationalists. 
Receiving the support of the military is crucial for effective leadership in China.  In 
1989, to the embarrassment of Deng Xiaoping, many military leaders were reluctant 
to attack students in the square.  As a result, the military was purged of those 
unwilling officers producing a more forceful and aggressive military leadership.  
China’s previous leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao did not seem to have full support 
of this more hawkish military.  Xi, on the other hand, has been able to use his 
childhood connections and superior standing as the son of a revolutionary leader to 
consolidate power.  This may be one reason why Xi has recently been so hawkish.  Xi 
84NetEase. "法媒:美派B-52挑战中国防空区 中方未拦截." www.163.com. November 27, 2013. 




                                                          
needs to appear strong and capable in military circles in order to gain their trust.85  
President Xi has been putting forth his vague “Chinese Dream” policy, to rejuvenate 
China.  It is unclear whether rejuvenating China includes retribution for past harms, 
or if Xi’s actions are just temporary to placate the military and their hawkish citizen 
supporters.  There have been many indications of a split in policy direction 
perspective at the top levels of CCP leadership.  Some Chinese scholars have 
admitted, off the record, that Xi has had to take actions that do not reflect his true 
aspirations.86  This could show the power of the burgeoning nationalist influence in 
China.  Because of the opaque nature of the CCP’s decision-making process, 
however, we cannot know for sure. 
The domestic conservative propaganda agenda is mostly supported and 
disseminated by CCP leaders who are themselves conservative and anti-West.87  The 
system is therefore self-serving.  The top-down nationalists are created through 
public bombardment of the historical victim scenario by media, education, arts, 
publications, music, theater, and movies etc., and then this same population is used 
to support the desires of the more conservative Chinese leaders.  Currently, the 
seven member Politburo Standing Committee, the elite center of China’s decision 
making, is very conservative.  Thought to be a result of octogenarian Jiang Zemin’s 
influence to slow reform, five of the seven members are conservatives.  This old-
85 Dreyer, June Teufel. "China's Xi Jinping: Hawk or Reformer?" Foreign Policy Research Institute. December 
2013. http://www.fpri.org/articles/2013/12/chinas-xi-jinping-hawk-or-reformer (accessed 
December 10, 2013). 
 
86 Anderlini, Jamil. "Blueprint for Reform Targets Corruption." Financial Times, November 27, 2013: 1-2 FT 
Special Report. 
87 Shambaugh, David. "China's Propaganda System, Instutions, Processes and Efficacy." The China Journal (The 
University of Chicago Press), January 2007.  p.10 
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school guidance will be short term, however, as all five of these elderly members 
will be forced to retire by law in 2017.88  The recent calls for stability and peace 
coupled with aggressive action either reveal a hypocrisy in Xi’s leadership agenda, 




Understanding the issue of Chinese nationalism is greater than 
understanding its nature and its inspiration.  Although containment of Chinese 
nationalism is not one hundred percent certain, it is clear that the CCP seeks to 
create and motivate, manipulate and control them.  By erecting the world’s greatest 
propaganda and information control apparatus, they are largely successful.  The CCP 
feels it must control its population’s opinion, as they are fearful that factions with 
dissenting opinion and collective action will undermine CCP stability and legitimacy.  
By limiting expression and access to certain ideas, China’s leaders increase their 
ability to stay in power, and therefore stability.  China’s propagandized education 
system and censorship mold a xenophobic citizen ready to work hard for their 
motherland.  They dream of a strong China and retribution for past humiliations.  
This paradigm supports the conservative agenda for firm government control and a 
strong military.  There is, however, also the bottom-up nationalist who, for the most 
88 Blanchard, Ben and Wee, Sui-Lee. "China Names Conservative, Older Leadership." Reuters. November 15, 
2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/15/us-china-congress-idUSBRE8AD1GF20121115 (accessed 
December 10, 2013). 
89Baker, Peter, and Jane Perlez. "Airlines Urged by U.S. to Give Notice to China." The New York Times. November 
29, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/30/world/asia/china-scrambles-jets-for-first-time-in-new-air-
zone.html?_r=0 (accessed December 10, 2013).  
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part, is a free thinker.  They may be unpredictable, emotional, and irresponsible, but 
they seek to change the world for the better.  While the CCP champions the dogmatic 
top-down loyalists and fears the erratic behavior of the bottom-up justice seekers, 
research has shown the latter group is less concerning.  The liberal nationalists are 
better informed, more tolerant of criticism, and less resentment driven than the top-
down group.90  They are also are more willing to use information and collective 
action to expose injustice, even at the expense of the leaders of China.  This sort of 
dissent worries the CCP. 
No matter whom controls the nationalists, their emotional reactions, and 
potential for instability are real, and their actions are hard to predict.  So far, China’s 
rulers, like puppet masters, have been able to loosen the reins, and tighten them 
back up to serve their purposes.  Yet, analysis of this subject is not a matter of 
assembling factual pieces, but rather, it requires knowing the Chinese experience, 
understanding leadership decision-making processes and predicting China’s spirit 
and vigor.  It is impossible to anticipate how dangerous this manipulation of passion 
could be to constructive relations and negotiations during a time of tension.  The 
United States, understanding this threat, must carefully pick its battles, and 
mindfully choose its words to avoid needlessly alienating this group, especially 
when engaging China in historically sensitive matters such as disputes in the East 
China Sea.  
90 Gries, Peter, Michael Crowson, Huajian Cai, and Qingmin Zhang. "Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US 




                                                          
Simultaneously, the US must seek methods to appeal to the less xenophobic 
bottom-up patriots.  They seek to make their mark by helping build a just China.  
Aiding them in this venture by providing information and structure for social 
services in China could be mutually beneficial.  Involving them in the development 
of and organizational dispersal of smart phone apps to aid in health issues or water 
safety is one example.  Providing infrastructure through NGOs to help migrant 
workers with healthcare and child education issues is another possibility.  These 
efforts would show the values of American democracy in a positive light.  Positive 
action is more influential than words.  These are gestures that will remain in the 
hearts of those served for a generation and will engender gratitude toward those 
who provide assistance. 
The most important tool in supporting information freedom is the model of 
the United States as an innovative, flexible, dynamic nation.  While information 
control in China increases stability, it clearly benefits the ruling elite.  Through 
propaganda programs, censors and information manipulation China creates a 
political body whose opinion is not based in fact.  These citizens are unable to freely 
participate in the marketplace of ideas.  The expansion of the Internet has created a 
struggle over the very nature of information dissemination, who controls it, and 
who has access to it.  Those who control information determine who will reap the 
benefits of it, and who will be left behind.  It is evident that the future of liberty and 
freedom rest in free access to information, and the United States must strive to 






















China’s penchant for cyber espionage and intellectual property (IP) theft has 
recently been in the news again,91  leading Americans to question the veracity of China’s 
‘peaceful rise’.  Although outwardly advocating national sovereignty, China’s internal 
and external information control have a negative effect on global information freedom 
and encroach on U.S. information sovereignty and US national security.  For this reason 
China’s peaceful rise rhetoric, which advocates a respect for state sovereignty and 
underscores China’s role as a responsible leader, is in direct opposition to its cyber 
activity.92  Likewise, the calculated pillaging of U.S. intellectual property, while not a 
bloody confrontation, certainly is not the action of a peaceful world leader.  China, for 
its part, claims the development of internal and external information control is needed 
to preserve political stability and strengthen Chinese Communist Party (CCP) legitimacy 
as China reaches its goal of becoming a middle class society.93  This paper will explore 
China’s manipulation, exploitation, and censorship of information through the lens of 
China’s ‘peaceful rise’ to understand the contradictions in how China presents itself to 
the world.   
This paper will discuss the history of China’s peaceful rise policy, as well as inner 
CCP conflict over the meaning of this term and very possibility of such a rise.  These 
91 Mandiant Intelligence Center Report. APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units. 02 23, 2013. 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/?gclid=CJas3dDC3LUCFYqk4AodQXMAdg 
 
92 Wortzel, Dr. Larry M. A Rising China and East Asian Security: Implications for the United States. 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, 2011. 




                                                          
disagreements are couched in a political atmosphere deeply influenced by China’s past, 
and fueled by fear of American hegemony.  Interestingly, these same fears and historical 
memories contribute to China’s incentive to control information.  This paper will then 
define information control and outline the many ways China manipulates information to 
serve the CCP.  An explanation of the historical context to China’s internal information 
control, cultural factors, as well as citizen support for this lack of freedom will be given.  
While this paper is a study of China’s external information control and its threat to 
global information freedom as well as its threat to China’s peaceful rise, it is difficult to 
do this without analyzing how and why China controls information internally, which will 
briefly be touched upon. 
Primarily, the conflicting positions of the United States and China on the topic of 
information control will be explored.  Certainly, there are many different views of 
Internet sovereignty worldwide, which leave ample scholarship opportunities for future 
papers, but for the sake of brevity, the discussion will be confined to the fundamental 
disagreement between America and China.  This paper ends with insights and possible 
actions to mitigate the increasingly tense U.S. – China dialogue about information 
freedom and Internet sovereignty, and simultaneously create an environment conducive 
to China’s peaceful rise. 
For this paper, information control is defined as material and indicators 
conveyed, denied, manipulated or sabotaged to invoke estimates that result in actions 
38 
 
or information advantageous to the ‘controllers’  interests and objectives.94  The 
Chinese approach this capability in several different ways.  One method is the 
dissemination of propaganda.  The ‘peaceful rise’ campaign includes initiatives to 
counter negative Western media reports and what some Chinese leaders call American 
information hegemony. 95   They encompass heavily funded twenty-four hour English 
language news shows to inform the world of China’s unique story and perspective, as 
well as hundreds of Confucius Institutes to teach Chinese language in all four corners of 
the world.96  These ventures into soft power have been partially successful.97 
Other methods of information control employed by the CCP include information 
manipulation and sabotage, censorship and surveillance.  These approaches also seek to 
overpower the damage done by perceived anti-Chinese media attention or 
organizations while simultaneously shoring up CCP legitimacy and stability.  These 
94The Free Dictionary. Information Control. April 20, 2013. 
www.thefreedictionary.com/controlled+information. 
  I have augmented a definition of information control from the Free Dictionary to form a broader 
definition.   
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Cyber War. New York, NY: Harper-Collins Publisher, 2010.pp47-55 
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include manipulation of information, domestically and abroad, by censorship, blocking, 
altering, or theft of private information, intimidation, and espionage.98   
The last area of consideration consists of methods employed to utilize 
vulnerabilities in the cyber information network to overcome the US lead in 
information.99  These include degradation, mapping, corrupting, stealing, and disabling 
the “substance” of U.S. cyber systems.  This includes IP theft, data surveillance, critical 
infrastructure, and node sabotage.100  These cyber infiltrations pinpoint or create 
vulnerabilities in U.S. government, military and private networks for later exploitation.  
The effects of this kind of activity are possibly devastating, as they could shut down or 
sabotage power grids, telecommunications, water filtration plants as well as financial 
institutions and military command and control centers.101 
This paper will look in depth at each of these areas of China’s information 
control, and seek to examine each case through the lens China’s peaceful rise, present 
national condition, as well as the historical context.   
98 Buruma, Ian.  "Battling the Information Barbarians." Wall Street Journal. January 30, 2010. 
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Peaceful Rise 
The term ‘peaceful rise’ was first used in 2002 by Zheng BiJian on a trip to the 
United States with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) research group China Reform Forum.  
By February 2004, Hu Jintao had made the term the center piece of his foreign policy 
soft power initiative.102  Zheng Bijian, in a 2005 Foreign Affairs article, underscores 
China’s development difficulties such as poverty, low per capita income, and scarcity of 
resources, and the necessity of a peaceful rise to overcome these obstacles.  According 
to Zheng Bijian, China harbors no hegemonic tendencies, and abhors the seizing of 
power and resources characteristic of Western nations post World War I.  Furthermore, 
China policy protects the idea of national sovereignty, thus emphasizing that China will 
not meddle in the affairs of other nation states.103   
Despite the appearance of a united front on ‘peaceful rise’, there was inner party 
debate on the usefulness and limitations of the ’peaceful rise’ policy.  CCP leaders have 
voiced concerns about the policy’s inherent limitations.  Some fear that the phrase lacks 
humility, and could incite nationalism in China’s proud youths.104  These young patriots 
crave retribution for the 100 years of humiliation endured during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century at the hands of powerful Western nations and Japan.  They long 
102Glaser, Bonnie, and Evan S Medeiros. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: The 
Ascension and Demise of 'Peaceful Rise'." The China Quarterly, 2007pp. 291-310 
http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S0305741007001208 
103 Zheng, Bijian. 2005. "China's "Peaceful Rise" to Great-Power Status.”  Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5: 18-24.  
104Glaser, Bonnie, and Evan S Medeiros. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: The 




                                                          
to rise above the West economically and politically and at times call for violent 
tactics.105  Managing the criticism of an increasingly educated and middle-class youth, 
often proud and arrogant, is also of importance to the CCP to preserve stability and 
legitimacy.106 
The ‘peaceful rise’ policy also limits opportunities for a forceful re-unification 
with Taiwan.  Hardliners want to keep these options open.  They fear Taiwan could 
construe ‘peaceful rise’ to mean that China has eliminated the possibility of the use of 
force to conclude the China-Taiwan issue.107  This could strengthen Taiwan’s 
independence movement as well as increase U.S. military support to Taiwan.  Similarly, 
there are leaders who fear that the hegemonic United States would seek to contain 
China’s growth and not allow for its peaceful rise.108  CCP leaders claim that the United 
States supports organizations that provoke internal instability, which could lead to the 
fall of the CCP.  They also fear U.S. alliances and anti-Chinese factions within the U.S. 
government seek to thwart China’s economic rise.109  Consideration of these situations 
105 Zhao, Suisheng. "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable?" Journal of Asian Studies, 
2009.pp135,  
Gries, Peter Hayes. China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy. Berkley: University of 
California Press, 2004. 
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lead to an opposition to ‘peaceful rise’ policy, and the support of a policy that allows for 
conflict if the United States attempts to compromise China’s increasing power.110   
These opposing voices in Chinese politics make it difficult to understand policy 
intentions.  Increasingly, analysts of Chinese policy use ‘uncertain’ and ‘ambiguous’ to 
describe China’s politics.  Zheng Wang, a policy scholar and Seton Hall professor, asserts 
China’s leaders are ‘insecure and uncertain’ and their increasingly ‘arrogant and 
aggressive’ military stance just hides their ‘ambivalence and weakness’.  He states that 
Chinese leaders disagree about domestic and foreign policy.  Instead of dealing with 
these conflicts, they heighten propaganda and thus nationalism to hide these clashes.  
While this deflects CCP weakness and increases support for the regime, it also distances 
the United States.111  Nationalist rhetoric in China can be stridently anti-West and thus a 
rallying point for American distrust of China. 
Perhaps, however, ‘peaceful rise’ is a propaganda campaign, and the conflicting 
CCP voices are staged to enable a more flexible and evolving policy to meet uncertain 
threats. 112  The United States has found the ‘strategic ambiguity’ policy toward Taiwan 
to be quite advantageous as it allows maximum flexibility.  Perhaps China is constructing 
an overall ambiguous policy to deter the United States from aggressive action in China’s 
 
110Glaser, Bonnie, and Evan S Medeiros. "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: The 
Ascension and Demise of 'Peaceful Rise'." The China Quarterly, 2007 pp304 
 
111 Wang, Zheng. "Does China Have a Foreign Policy?" New York Times. March 18, 2013. 
www.nytimes.com/2013/13/19/opinion/does-china-have-a-foreign-policy.html?pagewanted=all 
 
112Stern, Rachel E, and Kevin J O'Brian. "Politics at the Boundary: Mixed Signals and the Chinese State." 




                                                                                                                                                                             
neighborhood.  If America is unsure what China’s reaction will be, or is fearful of 
escalation by hawkish rogues, the United States is more apt to stay calm and seek to 
smooth tensions. 
It is more likely, however, that there is a chasm between the Chinese military 
and civilian leaders.  The Chinese military is inherently more distrustful of the United 
States (and more hawkish) than China’s civilian leaders.113  Perhaps PLA leadership is not 
entirely controlled by China’s civilian leaders. In the fall of 2012, there were rumors of a 
military coop.  While this is unlikely, it reflects the Chinese people’s perception of 
increasing military power.114  In the news, reports of increasingly outspoken and 
provocative PLA generals contrast in comparison to China’s careful civilian leaders who 
demurely tote the party line.115 
These militant views and rumors speak directly to the more conservative anti-
China camp in the United States, eliciting a response and feeding suspicions.  Alastair 
Iain Johnston states it is precisely this view that swells mutual China- U.S. distrust. 116 To 
view every move as adversarial, and develop a ‘tit for tat’ behavior toward each other 
will certainly turn China and the United States into enemies.  In light of China’s dramatic 
economic development and continuing adherence to economic norms, Johnston feels 
113 Scobell, Andrew. "Is There a Civil-Military Gap in China's Peaceful Rise?" Parameters, 2009. pp8 
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the path of distrust can be avoided.117  Concentrating on common ground and mutual 
understanding rather than seeking differences and forcing change is widely advocated 
by many of America’s current China policy analysts.118 
These internal CCP debates about ‘peaceful rise’ are reflected in China’s 
information control policies.  CCP leaders with PLA ties would be supportive of a strong 
military, and more likely to tighten internal control to increase regime stability.  They 
would see ‘peaceful rise’ as a weak foreign policy not suited for China’s increased 
power.  In the present system, where China’s large state- owned enterprises are 
government supported, and create dual use technology, one can say the Chinese system 
is primed to focus every sector on procuring advanced technology in order to build 
advanced weaponry.119  Cyber theft delivers the advanced technology needed.  These 
actions create global suspicion of China and negate the ’peaceful rise’ dogma.120 
Explorations of these discussions are important.  At the core of this debate lies 
the heart of what kind of country China will become, the nature of its global leadership, 
and how the United States will react to this leadership.  The United States must now 
focus on how to influence this debate and its outcome in a positive manner.   
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China’s Information Control 
As the fears of internal instability and CCP loss of legitimacy, as well as a desire 
for greater military strength fuel China’s zeal for information control, it is important to 
understand the method and reasoning behind this policy.  A study focused on China’s 
social media censorship methodology revealed that the kind of information China 
deems to be destabilizing is not necessarily criticism of the government.  Rather, what is 
constrained, and thereby feared by the CCP, are those posts that might provoke 
collective action or protests.  The study also showed an increase of management and 
manipulation of information for CCP use rather than decisive censorship.  The governing 
hierarchy censors those with destabilizing ideas, and also monitors and molds online 
discourse for its own purposes.121  This allows Chinese citizens the illusion of 
deliberative government.122  China, using these same methods, controls information 
beyond its sovereign boundaries.  China has broadened its information control to 
external internet areas through state sponsored information campaigns, intimidation, 
legal action, and network attacks.  
China’s global attempt to control information simultaneously reveals fears of 
destabilizing elements and of the superior communications technology of the West.  
Chinese leaders and citizens are deeply suspicious of the internet and its new 
121 MacKinnon, Rebecca. "China's "Networked Authoritarianism"." Journal of Democracy 22, no. 2 
(2011)32-46 
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technologies.  They regard the Internet as a U.S. military invention, created to enable 
the West to achieve worldwide information hegemony.  The 1990 US military operation 
Desert Storm exposed China to the huge US lead in information technology.  Alarmed 
Chinese military leaders advocated finding vulnerabilities in the U.S. cyber-information 
network to overcome this imbalance of power.123  Just as information technology is not 
limited to military use, this strategy of offensively using U.S. reliance on cyber networks 
to weaken the United States is not limited to the battlefield.  It is not bound by 
traditional constraints of physical national borders, Rule of Law, contemporary views of 
success and defeat, peacetime and wartime activities, or taboo.  According to the 
militant authors of Unrestricted Warfare, an iconic Chinese publication about 
asymmetric warfare, Chinese strategists seek to apply these tactics to as many areas as 
possible.  This publications provides a detailed list of possible targets, including the 
arenas of politics, economics, religion, culture, networks, geography, environment, 
outer space, cyberspace, terrorism, subversive activities, and international crime.124 The 
goal is to use “all means whatsoever…to force the enemy to serve one’s own 
interests”.125 
 An example of a program to capture and manipulate US economic, government, 
and military information is recounted in a Project 2049 Institute report about the PLA’s 
123 Mulvenon, James. The PLA and Information Warfare. Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, 1999.  
pp.176 
 
124 Qiao, Liang, and Xiangsui Wang. "Unrestricted Warfare." cryptome.org. February 1999.  pp.25-29,62 
http://cryptome.org/cuw.htm  
 




                                                          
Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure.  It details the 
structure of the PLA General Staff Department’s (GSD) First “Information Support 
(Assurance) Base”.  This is part of a development strategy to ‘informationize’ its civilian 
and military infrastructure to sustain its economic growth, to compete in the 
information and communication technology field, and ensure national security.126  The 
authors of this report state that information dominance, for economic, political, or 
military purposes, necessitates great skill in both the electromagnetic and global cyber 
sphere.  The GSD Third Department is huge in size and objective.  It is responsible for 
observing foreign communications and assuring security of the PLA computer 
communications networks.  It also carries out surveillance via computer networks on 
targets of interest worldwide.  They possess some of the most highly trained linguists in 
the world with additional specialties in banking, financial transactions, military activities, 
energy, and diplomatic exchanges.  Through phone call monitoring, email retrieval, 
voice and word recognition technology, encryption-breaking capabilities and huge 
computing power, a targeted organization’s plans and capabilities can be known as 
events develop.127  The authors also indicate that China seeks, through a combination of 
psychological warfare and computer network operations, to oppose and negate ideas 
deemed to be harmful to political and economic instability.  This may include the 
126 Stokes, Mark A, Jenny Lin, and Russell L.C. Hsiao. "The Chinese People's Liberation Army Signals 
Intelligence and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure." Project 2049. 11 11, 2011. pg2.  Quoted from the 
PRC Embassy in Washington’s website “China Maps Out Development Strategy,” May 11, 2006.  
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t251756.htm. 
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mapping and analysis of social networks to identify friends and enemies among 
American’s lawmakers and leaders.128  This information could also be used to study 
leader’s decision-making patterns, or to form an algorithm to predict their behavior in 
various situations. 
 Examples of China’s efforts to influence other sovereign nation’s foreign policy 
are analyzed in the U.S.-China Security and Review Commission 2010 report.  It gives 
detailed insight into Operation Aurora, Titan Rain, as well as Ghostnet; three China 
sponsored programs to censor and intimidate foreign and Chinese activists, journalists, 
and government workers outside of China. 129  Groups such as the Falun Gong, followers 
of the Dalai Lama, or individuals such as the famous artist Ai Weiwei and Nobel Peace 
Prize winning Liu Xiaobo fall into this category.  When they are not imprisoned, their 
emails are routinely hacked into; personal information is deleted or blocked.130  In 2009, 
GhostNet infiltrated at least 1,295 computers in 130 countries compromising the Dalai 
Lama’s government in exile and its contacts.  “Whaling” for particular targets within the 
Dalai Lama’s organization, it focused on specific correspondence and gained control of 
key computers.  Due to these penetrations, Tibetan activists were detained in China and 
told to stop what were perceived to be anti-CCP activities.  Likewise, the Chinese 
government meddled in other nation’s affairs by pressing diplomats, whose 
correspondence was accessed by GhostNet, to decline their email invitations to meet 
128 Ibid pp.17 
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with the Dalai Lama.131  .  These campaigns, attacks, and intimidation techniques have 
negative implications for global Internet freedom.132 
Some of China’s information campaigns, however, show China’s efforts in a 
positive light.  In establishing Confucius Institutes worldwide China hopes to promote 
Chinese language and culture globally and boost exchange between Chinese and foreign 
universities to assist in creating business activity.133  Most Confucius Institutes are 
formed through collaboration between a local foreign university and a Chinese 
university.  At present most are located in Southeast Asia.134  The Office of the Chinese 
Language Council International (Hanban) supplies the funds to set up the program, and 
provides the teachers and teaching materials.  There is a nominal cost to attend the 
classes.  James Paradise in his paper entitled “The Role of Confucius Institutes in 
Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power” broaches the question of whether these institutes are 
“Trojan Horses”.  Do the Chinese have an ulterior motive in creating this global language 
program, especially when those funds could be used to educate the millions of citizens 
in China who do not have access to secondary schooling?  Is the application of the CCP 
131 Markoff, John. "Vast Spy System Loots Computers in 103 Countries." 29 03 2009. New York Times. 28 
11 2011 www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/technology/29spy.html. 
132MacKinnon, Rebecca.  "Networked Authoritarianism in China and Beyond: Implications for Global 
Freedom.”  Liberation Technology in Authoritarian Regimes. Palo Alto: Stanford University, 2010. pp.30 
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propaganda curriculum worldwide detrimental to freedom of speech and other core 
liberal beliefs?  Mr. Paradise thinks not.  While the CCP puts forth a rigid program of 
study, with highly censored study material, the actual day-to-day workings of the 
programs, which are far from Beijing’s oversight, are flexible. Depending on their 
partner university and clientele the curriculum focus is flexible enough to include such 
diverse subjects as business, medical and health issues, and research orientation.  
According to interviews conducted by Paradise with several heads of Confucius 
Institutes, teachers are unlikely to restrict conversation flow to CCP sanctioned topics.135  
Here Mr. Paradise sees a rift between CCP expectations and the desires of the Chinese 
academics that run the programs.  The CCP sees the language schools as a means to 
craft and tell its story as well as a way to bolster business activity and trade; the 
academics see the institutes as a way to increase exchanges with foreign scholars and 
thereby bolster Chinese innovation.  
The operation of the Confucius Institutes in Southeast Asia provides an insight 
into how China seeks to advance its interests in the area.  The Institutes are influential in 
that they teach ‘Beijing’ Mandarin Chinese in the mainland simplified character style 
rather than the traditional characters that are taught in Taiwan and used in Taiwan-
based newspapers.  This diminishes the exposure to Taiwan’s opinion, and potentially 
limits its foreign policy influence.136  In this way Beijing Chinese is becoming the business 
135 Paradise, James. "The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft Power." Asian Survey 49, 
no. 4 (2009). pp652 
136Gill, Bates and Huang, Yanzhong. "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'." Survival 48, no. 2 




                                                          
and diplomatic language of the region, a soft power in its own right.  The Confucius 
Institutes perform a regional service as well.  The program educates tens-of-thousands 
of students in South East Asia and provides free or subsidized Chinese language study in 
a private primary school environment for students in poor nations like Cambodia.137 The 
Confucius Institutes are therefore a classic example of Nye’s soft power:  a credible 
public diplomacy program that creates a large audience for its ‘story’ and attracts 
favorable opinion.138 
 Another area in which China seeks to advance its influence is in media 
dissemination.  In 2009, China set in motion a seven billion dollar expansion of its 
overseas media.  This expansion includes a 24-hour all news English language channel, 
and the addition of French, Spanish, Arabic and Russian news channels.  Xinhua news 
agency is also almost doubling the number of overseas bureaus from 100 to 186, and 
many Chinese newspapers are now publishing English language versions (whose content 
is completely different from the Chinese version).  While this may seem benign, and a 
natural extension of China’s soft power due to its growing importance as a world power, 
one must remember, one fundamental fact is unchanged:  China Central Television 
(CCTV) is self-described as the “mouthpiece of the Party and government”.139  On the 
CCTV Chinese language website, the new foreign language TV channel ventures are 
137 Kurlantzick, Joshua. "China's Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia." Current History, September 2006. 
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portrayed as “reaching a new level in external propaganda.”140  China has modernized 
and refocused its media objectives from old-fashioned Maoist propaganda to a more 
sophisticated goal; to persuade and convince its audience of the CCP’s legitimacy and its 
peaceful intentions.141  Bequelin states “English language news from China is not about 
informing the foreign public, it is about channeling a specific view of China to the rest of 
the world.”142  Given the biased and suspicious nature of China’s media, can this effort 
lead to soft power, enhancing China’s story of a peaceful rise? 
 A study by Zhang and Cameron provide analysis that any gain in positive media 
coverage due to a CCP funded propaganda campaign is ephemeral at best.  Zhang and 
Cameron evaluated the success of a well-publicized September 2000 Chinese public 
relations campaign focused on the United States.  This included a CBS 60 Minutes 
interview of China’s President Jiang Zemin, a “2000 US Tour of Chinese Culture” visit to 
nine American cities, as well as a visit to Hawaii by the Northern Sea Fleet of the Chinese 
Navy.  Zhang and Cameron studied articles in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times  
and the Washington Post four months prior to the campaign and found articles about 
China to be predominately negative (24% were about severe crisis, 70% about conflict 
and 32% about violence).143  The newspaper coverage became slightly more positive 
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after the media blitz, but four months after the campaign, the papers resumed their 
pre-campaign levels of negativity, thus the public relations effort had no lasting effect.  
Economic and political relations were stable during this time.  This led Zhang and 
Cameron to believe that China’s public diplomacy surge has little long-term effect on 
Western media coverage.144   
Zhang and Cameron’s findings, while thought provoking, are already a decade 
old, a decade that has seen great change.  This analysis would be more beneficial if it 
were current and with a corresponding solicitation of US public opinion.  The article also 
does not attempt to discern exactly why the influence of the media campaign was 
fleeting.  Was it due to the campaign’s lack of credibility?  Or do the Western media still 
view China through the biased and undeserved lens of communism?  Or is much of the 
social news that comes out of China somewhat disheartening, or threatening to the 
United States, and therefore negative by nature?  The results of Zhang and Cameron’s 
paper are limited to proving that during a 9-month period, one Chinese public relations 
campaign had little or no long-term effect on the negative depiction of China in three 
major US newspapers.  Although this study leads one to believe that China’s short-term 
media campaigns are ineffective, more research must be done on the influence of 
China’s current temporary and sustained media  drives. 
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Historical Context of Information Control 
According to the theory of constructivism, language, culture, history, collective 
values, and philosophy play an integral part in how a country behaves.  Certainly, 
knowledge of China’s history and study of China’s predominant thinkers aids one’s 
understanding of their domestic and foreign policy.  In China, it is still common to view 
their country as occupying a central position, with other countries on the peripheral 
paying tribute to China’s greatness.145  Historically, Chinese have assimilated their 
enemies into their traditional hierarchical Confucian social structure.  The nomadic 
Mongols and the more recent Manchurians conquered China, yet still assimilated and 
accepted China’s leadership and social structure even as they ruled.146  There are many 
examples of China prying into other country’s affairs, mandating that foreign media, 
universities, and textbook companies change their tone to present China in a more 
positive light.  Diplomats, world leaders, and journalists have been manipulated by 
China to alter their plans and not meet with the Dalai Lama.   This may reflect a Chinese 
belief that Chinese leaders should have control over how China is depicted by others, or 
that it is within China’s prerogative to restrict Western media or mandate whom a state 
head can meet with.  Control over the world’s discourse about China seems to be a 
strategic objective based in the Sinocentric conviction that the world will assimilate to 
China’s set of values.147 
145
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From the perspective of propaganda and soft power, China’s ‘peaceful rise’ is 
part of this push to control the global narrative about China and to assimilate the world.  
The good deeds (free education in Chinese) of the Confucius Institutes have given China 
influence and respect.  China’s media campaigns, however, have been met with 
suspicion, as the broadcasts are not always based on fact.  China’s vast espionage 
ventures to steal IP, as well as influence communications between foreign entities and 
the Dalai Lama and Falun Gong, have been successful in that they have met their goal 
(acquisition of billions of dollars of IP and intimidation of foreign leaders into bend to 
China’s will).  These actions, however, have also provoked global anger and distrust.  
PLA activity in espionage and sabotage is widespread and frequent. Because of the 
dangers, this area of Chinese information control requires the urgent attention of U.S. 
government leaders.  This area least conforms to China’s peaceful rise policy.  General 
Alexander, the director of the U.S. National Security Agency, states this theft of huge 
amounts of IP constitutes one of the largest shifts of wealth in the history of man.148  
This negates China’s claim that it would never resort to ‘resource grabs’ to build wealth.  
Constant cyber intrusions and sabotage of U.S. government, military and civilian 
information networks are not a ‘peaceful’ action.  They are aimed at building a superior 
military, which arouses global suspicion. 
What drives China to commit these acts?  China’s history of upheaval and 
subordination to powerful Western nations has awakened in China a desire to surpass 
148 American Enterprise Institute. Cyber Security and American Power. July 09, 2012. 
http://www.aei.org/events/2012/07/09/cybersecurity-and-american-power/   .  General Alexander states 




                                                          
the U.S. economically and resume its rightful global position.  China’s late Qing dynasty 
history is marked by foreign invasion, domination, and civil war, marring China’s proud 
history of notable cultural and scientific innovations.  Its relationship with the West is 
impaired by a century of humiliations enforced on China by the advanced military 
technology of the West and Japan from the First Opium War in 1839, to the founding of 
the People’s Republic of China in 1949.  In the tension filled post 1989 Tiananmen 
crackdown atmosphere, U.S. military information dominance in Desert Storm stoked the 
fear of another round of Western domination of China.  The Chinese Communist Party, 
fearful of a repetition of history, and understanding the advantages of quick 
modernization, began a program of acquisition of high-level technology by any means 
necessary.  149   
In 1990, Deng Xiaoping had already started his policy of “gaige kaifang”, “to 
reform, and open up to the world”.  The result, through agricultural and market reform, 
was a GDP growth of 8-10% per year, which has continued to this day.150  This has 
increased China’s standard of living, political stability and citizen’s confidence in the 
CCP.  To sustain this extraordinary growth, and create a balance of power with the 
United States, China must continue to thrust forward in technology.  At present, China’s 
149 Spence, Jonathan D. The Search For Modern China. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990.pp.139-
333, Lieberthal, Kenneth. Governing China; From Revolution Through Reform. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2004.pp19-53, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Capability of the People's 
Republic of China to Conduct Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation. McLean, Virginia: Northrup 
Grumman Corporation, October 2009. 
 






                                                          
lack of innovative ability makes this impossible without technology theft.  China’s 
feelings of injustice, rooted in its past with the West, allow China to commit this theft 
without remorse.151   
This strong sense of injustice and suspicion of the West leads to strong support 
of the CCP among the Chinese people.  In addition, Confucian values advocate trust in 
the government as a source of stability and guardian of morals, a foundational quality of 
the Chinese people.152  Historically, Confucianism connects the economic strength of the 
state to legitimate rule, and advocates censorship as a tool to regulate moral and 
political life.153  Thus, censorship in China is a common theme throughout its history of 
dynastic rule.154  Not surprisingly, 84% of Chinese citizens approve of Internet regulation 
and control.155   
Many in China fear the strong influence of American culture and values, which 
also increases support for censorship and information control.  China doubts America’s 
true motives in advocating for human rights, freedom of speech and democracy, and 
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regards this resolve as an effort to sabotage Chinese political stability.156  Furthermore, 
the Chinese people see the Internet as a U.S. military invention, and therefore an 
instrument of foreign infiltration and possible oppression.157  New media is similarly 
regarded as a tool of the West to further its hegemonic strategy.  According to Liu 
Ruisheng, a researcher for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the goal of the 
United States is to push for network freedom in an attempt to spread democracy.  He 
emphasizes the need for “ideological security” to guard against American values on the 
internet.158   
As an example of the power of the seemingly benign new media, Chinese leaders 
cite the recent revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East.  They have been called 
“twitter” revolutions because of the use of social media to organize protesters.  China 
worries how much US domination of new media played a part in these citizen uprisings, 
and what the ramifications will be in China.  China considers US support of the Dalai 
Lama, Falun Gong and Chinese dissidents Chen Guangcheng, Rebiya Kadeer and Liu 
Xiaobo as provocative efforts to divide China and even plant seeds of democratic 
revolution.159  Regardless, China also understands the usefulness of new media.  China’s 
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“New Media Development Report (2011)” stresses new media’s importance for 
economic development, but also stresses the “need to uphold national security by 
ensuring social media as serving the people, socialism, and peaceful development.” 160  
Similarly, a Chinese Internet white paper states that China cannot develop in isolation 
from the rest of the world, and encourages openness and innovation in the field of 
Internet technology to fuel China’s economic engine161.  This brings to light that element 
in China’s government that understands that unrestrained information control will hurt 
China’s economy and espouses the need for more freedom of speech as well 
cooperation on cyber problems.162  Elizabeth Economy calls this a kind of 
“schizophrenia”; the Chinese know freedom of information is needed for innovation, 
but simultaneously fear the instability of uncontrolled ideas.163  
Understanding China’s different approaches to controlling information, as well 
as the impact of divergent CCP views on the matter, are crucial to finding solutions.  
Internet and information freedom are core to the deliberative nature of the U.S. 
160
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economic and political systems.  Likewise, China’s systematic cyber-espionage and theft 
of billions of dollars of US intellectual property (IP) hurts the U.S. economy and hinders 
U.S.-China cooperation.  If, however, Joseph Nye’s statements are correct and China’s 
fears of information freedom are partially based in a belief that the United States uses 
information freedom to increase instability in China, the United States must counter this 
belief and calm its forceful rhetoric when possible.  Cold War language used in the US 
media and policy circles when referring to cyber difficulties with China heightens 
tensions and defensive measures on both sides and intensifies distrust.  Policy makers 
and the media frequently use “wartime as the paradigm case”, such as David Sanger’s 
headline “A New Cold War in Cyberspace” in his NYT article.  Language such as this only 
serves to escalate suspicions. 164   
 
 
How Can the United States Safeguard China’s Peaceful Rise in the Age of the Internet? 
 
The crux of the ‘peaceful rise’ dilemma lies in China’s hopes for harmony and 
prosperity juxtaposed against fears of internal instability and Western hegemony.  
Because of this duality, the CCP recognizes the advantages and disadvantages of 
declaring a peaceful foreign policy to the world.  China itself does not yet know what 
164 Penny, Jon. "Internet Censorship and the Rememberance of Infowars Past." Berkman Center, Harvard. 
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kind of power it wants to be.165  China’s leaders do not agree on how to proceed.  
Military leaders and CCP hawks see the United States as a block to superpower status.  
Therefore, ‘all peaceful strategies that would prevent China’s rise must be excluded’.166  
Others say the true threat to China’s stability is not external, but internal.  China’s 
political culture is hardly “harmonious” as China’s top leaders disagree on domestic and 
foreign policy.167  On the other hand, the show of uncertainty surrounding ‘peaceful 
rise’ and other Chinese policies could be a strategy of ambiguity to provide Chinese 
leadership with maximum flexibility.  Perhaps the more threatening voices in Chinese 
politics are given the stage to intimidate and deter U.S. action.   
Regardless of the veracity of ‘peaceful rise’, China’s actions in cyberspace have 
not been peaceful.  It has been proven that Chinese political and military leaders 
actively seek to exploit, manipulate, disable and corrupt information in U.S. cyber 
networks as well as interrupt and manipulate the flow of information.  This is a serious 
issue; it places U.S. political, military, and diplomatic social processes at risk and, 
therefore, must be addressed.168   
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In light of the U.S. –China mutual distrust, there are many areas of potential 
misunderstanding.  The United States must engage China.  As the balance of CCP 
opinion tips from economic partnership and ‘peaceful rise’ to aggressive militaristic 
suspicion, the United States must pursue policies that add weight to those CCP opinions 
that favor collaboration.  China’s economy also relies on the Internet as its lifeline.  
Negotiations with China about the free flow of information should highlight the 
economic advantages for all, the global consequences to unimpeded cyber theft, and 
the benefits of global norms, standards, guidelines, and regulation in cyberspace.  China 
and the United States must initiate high-level talks with an emphasis on commitment, 
seeking common areas of concern and working together to calm tensions and reduce 
risk of conflict. 169  Whether China’s rise is peaceful or not partially depends on the 
ability of the United States and China to belay mutual fears and cooperate on areas of 
common concern.  China fears the U.S. commitment to information freedom and sees it 
as a weapon.  The United States fears information control.  Given such a wide 
divergence of opinion, it is important to find common issues to in order to open 
dialogue.  
The United States and China have worked together to ensure peace in Asia for 
over thirty years.  Nixon and Zhou Enlai sought common ground and set aside 
differences in opinion to ally against our common threats to national security.  Kissinger 
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would ask the United States and China to do the same today.170  Dai Bingguo, former 
State Counselor of the PRC, in light of rapid globalization, also urges the need for 
mutually beneficial cooperation.171  Candid exchanges and a development of rapport 
with Chinese leadership may lead to mutually beneficial practical solutions.  Cyber-crime 
through bank fraud and identity theft is a problem the United States shares with China.  
China also voices its concerns about cyber maliciousness.  Their systems are under 
constant attack.  Because much of China’s software is pirated, and is therefore not 
updated and patched, China’s cyber apparatus is even more vulnerable than those in 
the United States.  A collaborative effort to fight crime, overcome the problems of 
attribution to identify hackers, and prevent these attacks would benefit both countries 
and increase transparency and trust.  A discussion to establish common terms, norms, 
and thresholds is mutually beneficial.  Terms such as cyber war, critical infrastructure, 
freedom of speech and information, and cyber terrorism have different connotations in 
China and America.  Likewise, leaders of both countries need to have a frank discussion 
about the ramifications of a powerful cyber-attack.  Given the interconnectedness of the 
world’s systems, the targeted nation would not be the only one harmed.172 
Including China in worldwide debates on internet governance, considering their 
suspicions, may assist us in finding common ground.  To invigorate deliberation amongst 
170 Ibid pg526 
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our peoples, and create innovative solutions, American and Chinese companies and 
government agencies can form a collaborative effort to educate citizens of both 
countries in cyber security and cyber-terms.  This effort can be taken on by media (TV 
and internet news shows or newspaper columns) or at educational centers.  To further 
mutual understanding, an increase in funds to train U.S. scientists and technology 
specialists in Chinese language skills is also beneficial.  Similarly, a joint effort to build 
smart phone applications to aid in education, promote health and encourage 
ecologically sound habits could highlight the positive aspects of information freedom. 
  Furthermore, while the U.S. and China may never agree on what kinds of free 
speech are lawful,173  discussions can begin with topics that both countries can agree 
are harmful to society, such as child pornography and human trafficking.  Working 
together on shared interests can lead to understanding in other areas, such as word 
definitions and mutually agreed upon terminology.  
The complicated and non-transparent nature of both countries’ cyber defense 
structures causes communications difficulties.  China’s system is opaque, while 
America’s is divided among several agencies.  To facilitate clearer cooperation between 
the two countries, streamlined communications on the topic of cyber security must be 
initiated.  The communications paradigm presently used is based upon arms control 
negotiations, a comparison that is not entirely useful.  The arms control model is 
convenient as a cyber-deterrent, but also emphasizes competition.  A negotiation 
173 The U.S. cannot even agree on this point with its NATO allies.  Many forms of hate speech, such as Nazi rhetoric 
and holocaust denial, are illegal in Europe but legal in the United States. 
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standard based on health issues, on the other hand, would emphasize information 
sharing and defensive measures.  The example of negotiations used in environmental 
talks should also be considered.  Looking at cyberspace as a “global commons” to be 
nurtured and protected would enhance cyber security in both countries.174 
 
Conclusion  
While it is not known if a spirit of U.S.-China collaboration will guarantee China’s 
peaceful rise, aggressive measures will only add to mutual distrust.  Robert Kagan 
believes the U.S. policies of free trade and information freedom must be imposed on 
‘reluctant partners’.175  He states the best and most logical policies do not necessarily 
win, rather, the policies of the strongest win.  Kagan states that because the United 
States has suppressed its power, China has expanded its ambitions and recalculated 
what is off limits.176  World politics in this view is win-lose.  He feels if the United States 
loses its hegemonic position, chaos will ensue.177 
Kagan’s world is West-oriented without flexibility to include outside possibilities.  
Given China’s present internal disagreement, Kagan’s doctrine could tip the balance of 
CCP appraisal towards aggressive policies.  The fact is; China is rising.  Millions have 
174Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Peter W Singer. Cybersecurity and U.S.- China Relations. Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institute, 2012.pp26 
 
175 Kagan, Robert. The World America Made. New York City: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012.pp43 
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been lifted out of poverty.  U.S. information freedom policy aims to give these people a 
voice in global affairs.  The future that includes these Chinese, and millions of other 
worldwide, will be politically (and religiously, culturally, socially) diverse, and it may not 
be possible to confine them to a Western concept of governance.  Frankly, the United 
States does not have the finances to bend the entire world to its will.  Alternatively, the 
United States must work with our global neighbors to build framework for cooperation 
and continued economic growth.  Success is not assured, but it may be the most 
promising route. 
China does not yet know what kind of power it wants to be.  It is unlikely that the 
indecision and ambivalence seen in China’s foreign policy is a mastermind strategy to 
confuse the United States into inaction.  The disharmony in Zhonghainan (the Chinese 
leadership compound) has provided too much embarrassing fodder for worldwide 
media to be staged.178  The split between moderate CCP leaders and their nationalistic 
and hawkish colleagues is evident.  This split is evident in the United States as well.  
America has China policy analysts who distrust China (Scobell, Mulvenon, Perry Link, 
Anne-Marie Brady, and Larry Wortzel) as well as those who believe China is not a threat 
(Kissinger, Jeffery Bader, Lieberthal).  Inherent in China’s dialogue about ‘peaceful rise’ 
are fears similar to the ambivalence surrounding the issues of information control and 
information freedom.  Fears of American hegemonic power constraining China’s rise, 
supported by Western history, fuel China’s aggressively defensive posture and 
178 The 2011 murder of Englishman Neil Haywood and the subsequent downfall of Bo Xilai and jailing of 




                                                          
threatening rhetoric.  The threatening rhetoric, in kind, leads to American distrust of 
China’s true intentions.  Tit-for-tat situations easily escalate. 
A Cold War stance toward China will lead to disharmony and possible aggression.  
Our two countries have too much in common, too much to lose, to go down that path.  
The United States and China have partnered in securing peace in East Asia for over thirty 
years, mainly by finding common ground.  The two countries should continue to face 
their problems in this same spirit.  This paper has shown that mutual distrust is partially 
born out of ignorance, and reliance on subjective history.  Mutual understanding, 
through education of the two country’s citizens and exchange programs for our military 
and political leaders, must become the status quo.  The big picture shows both China 
and the United States succeed in the current world system.  The current system includes 
a peacefully rising China, and an economic system based on information freedom. 
It must be made clear to China; information control will hurt China’s and 
America’s economic security.  In a 2010 Cisco, report researchers look at five possible 
future scenarios for the internet based on ease of connectivity, technological progress, 
and user behavior.  In one scenario, relentless cyber-attacks undermine user trust.  
Sophisticated internet security makes it too expensive for the average user.  In another, 
protectionist policy and strong regulation slows economic activity and restrains the 
internet’s potential.  The most successful scenario depicts a world in which information 
flows freely, connection is global, and fierce competition leads to affordable and highly 
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useful communication hardware and software.179  In order to guarantee this outcome, 
China’s peaceful rise, and ensure a prosperous collective future, the United States must 
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A struggle for the future of the Internet is currently being played out on the 
global stage.  The number of organizational acronyms, business contracts, technical 
innovations, human rights issues, governance disagreements, and hidden agendas make 
this a complex issue with complex solutions.  Recent news about NSA surveillance and 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’ (ICANN) restructuring of 
oversight (cutting its ties with the US Department of Commerce) has highlighted global 
fears about information control, state sovereignty, human rights, and the future of 
Internet governance (IG).  At the heart of this topic are the foundational Western values 
upon which the Internet was built: unhindered free flow of information, freedom of 
assembly online, right to privacy, and the transparency and accountability of the 
Internet’s governing bodies to those citizens who use the networks.  The powers that 
threaten these values are authoritarian governments like the Communist Chinese Party 
(CCP).  Chinese leaders fear the bottom-up nature of the current IG hiders their ability to 
control politically and socially destabilizing information.  Increasing the scope of this 
struggle is the fact that information is power.  In the future, who will wield this power?  
Those who control information and those who are able to eliminate obstacles to 
information will determine who benefits from the information revolution, and who is 
left behind.  Thus, the conversation about Internet governance is punctuated by fear 
and distrust.  Fear that the digital sphere, network content, and network technology will 
be used to exclude certain countries, or groups of people from the economic promises 
of the information revolution.  “The Internet’s architecture is now ground zero for 
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geopolitical conflict, rising state power, and the future of what counts as basic liberties 
in the digital era”180 
At the center of China’s concern over U.S. oversight of ICANN, is US information 
technology supremacy.  China is fearful the United States will employ its information 
domination, and spread subversive ideas, with the intent to cause the downfall of the 
CCP.  As a result, China seeks to pry the Internet from US control. 
The United States seeks to keep the power of information in the hands of the 
world’s citizens through multi-stakeholder (MSH) Internet governance (IG).  
Government information control in Syria, China, and Iran (as well as cybercrime attacks 
to Target and Neiman Marcus) have shown that the same technology that brings a 
world of information to the palm of one’s hand can be manipulated and become 
harmful to the world’s netizens. 
This paper will explore MSH governance through a study of ICANN, its history, its 
governance structure, and its future.  The term “multi-stakeholder” will be studied in its 
many forms.  Although China’s IG policies are not transparent, this paper will study 
China’s actions.  China is a vocal advocate for UN oversight of ICANN as an alternative to 
the current U.S. Department of Commerce oversight, which would place the heart of the 






                                                          
Internet in the control of governments rather than Internet engineers, business, and 
netizens.  It is important to understand why. 
Lastly, I will discuss the importance of the MSHG model as the Internet spreads 
to all areas of the globe, connecting to evermore people and things.  China is zealously 
researching and developing new Internet technologies such as the Internet of Things 
(IOT), a technology that will expand the Internet multifold.  I will conclude this paper 
with an analysis of the importance of MSH input for technical standards and IG 
legitimacy as the digital networks explode with possibilities. 
 
Why China Seeks to Influence Internet Governance 
In the mid-twenty first century, China is expected to surpass the United States as 
the world’s largest economy.  China’s miraculous economic rise is the result of hard 
work, focused policy, and its embrace of the global economy and the free marketplace.  
China’s tight grip on the political and social agenda, coupled with loosening of economic 
policy has strengthened its rise to a middleclass society.  China’s authoritarian form of 
capitalism has made it the envy of many developing countries, broadening its soft 
power appeal.  This combination of growing appeal and rising economic status has 
spurred China to seek influence on the global stage.  One such area is Internet 
governance.   
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China’s vibrant Internet society is the largest in the world with 618 million 
netizens yet, it ranks at the bottom in terms of Internet freedom.181  This is due to its 
heavy restriction, censorship, and online manipulation of information.  The Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) not only blocks and changes information that enters into their 
network, it also changes, blocks, and censors their citizen’s expressed content.  As the 
world becomes increasingly connected, these restrictions become increasingly difficult 
to control.  To facilitate effective and speedy information exchange, the basic private-
sector architecture of the Internet is based on information freedom and unquestioned 
connections between users.  The Chinese government finds this Internet construction to 
be too unconstrained and under the spell of U.S. information hegemony.  China seeks 
Internet sovereignty and multilateral government control of the Internet rather than the 
current MSH model comprised of software and hardware technicians, private sector, 
business, and governments.     
Control of the Internet’s core technical architecture would help China eradicate 
many challenges to maintaining and enforcing cyber control.  The challenges are: “The 
need for Internet operators to be globally coordinated and compatible; the ability of 
domestic actors to grasp the communicative opportunities of the Internet; the greater 
181 Peterson, Andrea. "China has Almost Twice as Many Internet users as the U.S. has People." 31 01 2014. The 
Washington Post. 31 03 2014. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01/31/china-has-
almost-twice-as-many-internet-users-as-the-u-s-has-people/>.      "Freedom on the Net 2013: A Global Assessment of 






                                                          
transparency fostered by the Internet communications; and China’s need to maintain 
trade relations with the rest of the world.“182  
The Chinese leadership’s desire for control over society and information 
originates in Confucian thought in 600B.C.E..  In China, scholars tend to reach back to a 
highly structured social paradise depicted in ancient Chinese texts to find the wisdom 
and strategy to move forward.183  Ancient Chinese scholars Confucius, Xunzi, and 
Mencius all believe that peace can be achieved if human behavior is restricted by those 
above them in the Confucian hierarchy.  The Confucian ‘rectification of names’ is an 
ancient Chinese ritual which names different elements in the social structure, and 
determines their appropriate spot in the rigid hierarchy.  By this naming, the role, and 
future conduct of the element are decided by those who have the power to name.  
Xunzi said that increasing material wealth will not lead to a harmonious society.184  
Instead, establishing rites and rituals for societal structure creates clear distinctions and 
enables all to understand their role in society.185  This is an interesting lens through 
which to view China’s recent activities in Internet governance.  If China does the naming, 
it then will have the power to mandate the hierarchical placement, the role and the 
behavioral expectations of the element named.  The West views this as problematic, 
because the success of the Confucian social structure hinges on the leadership of an 
182 Mueller, Milton. "China and Global Internet Governance: A Tiger By the Tail." Deibert, Ronald, et al. Access 
Contested: Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012. 177-194. P.186 
183 Luttwalk P.260 
Yan, Xuetong. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton university Press, 2011. 
P..36 
 
184 Yan, Xuetong P.175 
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omnipotent, wise, and benevolent dictator.  If the emperor dictator’s morals fail, 
heaven will support a people’s revolution to overthrow him, and will seat a new leader.  
This explains the CCP’s obsession with regime legitimacy and stability.  It also elucidated 
the West’s ideological split with China.  The West is suspicious of unchecked 
government authority, and prefers the use of systematic checks and balances to prevent 
the misuse of power. 
 
A History of Internet Governance 
The Internet started as an Advanced Research Projects (ARPA) development in 
the 1950’s, and was thus called ARPANET.  ARPA was a Department of Defense agency 
initiated by President Eisenhower to develop technology to compete with the USSR’s 
space initiatives such as Sputnik.  ARPA later became DARPA (Defense Advanced 
Research Projects).  ARPANET was strictly controlled by DOD until the early 1980’s, and 
while many US academics  from MIT, Harvard, Stanford and Berkley were involved in its 
pioneering days, the system was tightly restricted, only connecting computer to 
computer.  Eventually, internal networks, run by the National Science Foundation 
Network (NSFNET), were formed to support research communication, and a web of 
networks formed.186  An outgrowth of private Internet service providers (ISP) developed 




                                                          
to connect networks to serve the commercial Internet traffic, which was prohibited on 
NSFNET and ARPANET.187 
As the Internet grew, Internet protocol (IP) addresses became an area in need of 
standards and oversight.  Each IP address had to be unique in order for each name or 
sequence of numbers to serve a single party.  Furthermore, the use of the Internet for 
commercial purposes was flourishing.  A transparent organization was needed to take 
up the responsibility of assigning the millions of names and numbers needed globally.  
As a result, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) was 
founded by Jon Postel in 1998, as a multi-stakeholder organization comprised of 
technology innovators, academics, business, world citizens, and governments.188  
ICANN’s motto of “one world one Internet” emphasizes its desire to be a reflection of 
the global and diverse citizens of the Internet.189  According to its website, the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN):  
“coordinates the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) 
functions, which are key technical services critical to the continued 
operations of the Internet's underlying address book, the Domain Name 
System (DNS).  The IANA functions include: (1) the coordination of the 
assignment of technical protocol parameters including the management of 
the address and routing parameter area (ARPA) top-level domain; (2) the 
administration of certain responsibilities associated with Internet DNS root 
zone management such as generic (gTLD) and country code (ccTLD) Top-
Level Domains; (3) the allocation of Internet numbering resources; and (4) 
187 Singer, P.W. and Allan Friedman. Cyber Security and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2014. P..26 
188 Ibid p.29 
189 ICANN. Welcome. n.d. 10 03 2014. <https://www.icann.org/en/about/welcome>. 
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other services.  ICANN performs the IANA functions under a U.S. 
Government contract.”190   
Irrespective of ICANN’s U.S. government affiliation, it is a MSH organization, and seeks 
perspectives from all corners of the globe and multiple layers of society.  Additionally, 
ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) is open to all national governments 
that seek participation. 
On the Internet, one’s IP address is one’s identity.  This gives ICANN a great deal 
of power, for it decides who receives what top-level domain (TLD) addresses such as 
.com, or .net, or .edu, (as well as a recent flourish of new TLD addresses, such as 
.cheese, .apple, .plumbing, to name a few.) and can also decide to reject a request if the 
address is uncivil or misleading.  ICANN’s power over these functions gives it increased 
visibility and scrutiny.  It is, however, only one of many internet governance 
organizations.  ICANN and its brother organization, the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), represent just one layer of a multi-layer organism that is IG.  It embodies the 
technical and engineering level of IG.  The discussion of Internet content takes place at a 
different layer.   
The present day Internet still lacks basic standards and norms, not to mention 
laws.  While this has benefited entrepreneurs, it has also benefited spies, 
cybercriminals, and data miners.  The threat of cyber-attacks and the theft of personal 
information and intellectual property have started a global conversation about 




                                                          
forming regulations.  At the heart of this dialogue is fear that an unwitting change in the 
young and successful architecture of the Internet could have vast and damaging 
repercussions.   
As nations come to the table to address cyber-attacks and cyber-crime, China 
has aggressively pushed to change the free nature of the Internet structure.  Their 
desire is to hamper the influence of the US value of freedom of expression, and 
extricate the Internet from its current MSH governance.  The goal is to leave Internet 
governance in the hands of the UN’s International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
which favors world government consensus rather than business, academia, technology 
developers, and NGO consensus. The ITU, as an international organization that linked 
nations, was a new concept at its time of conception in 1865.  The ITU, however, 
reserved the right to “stop any transmission that they considered to be a violation of 
national laws, public order, or morals.”  ITU ensured a new era of global communication, 
but ensured the status quo powerful governments stayed in control.191  This model 
would not be sufficiently dynamic to be used for Internet governance, and would 
encourage power politics to be played out in the digital realm. 
Because of the Internet architecture and protocol, application for new ways to 
use the Internet and software can be applied directly onto the underlying network.  As a 
result, today’s Internet is an arena teeming with innovation.  This is how applications 
like Skype, Facebook, Twitter,  WeChat  can be laid over the existing structure with no 
191 Singer, P.W. and Allan Friedman. Cyber Security and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2014.P.181 
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need to ask permission from a governmental body or a communications company.  The 
Internet innovations witnessed by the world have been rapid and unhampered due to 
this lack of government regulation.  Adherence to standards is voluntary; there is no 
Internet regulation authority.  This has worked well for business and information flow.  
Many countries, however, deeply object to an unregulated Internet, and want to control 
what citizens can do online; whom they connect to, what their online content is, and 
their means of expression.192  This information policy would be harmful to the US 
economy, but since so much commerce is conducted over the Internet, it would be 
harmful to the economic development of authoritarian nations as well. 
The Internet economy already constitutes over 4% of GDP in G-20 countries, and 
funds over 8% of GDP in some developing countries.  Predictions estimate that there will 
be 3 billion people online by 2016, and that 80% of broadband connections will be via 
smartphones and tablets.  The fastest growing group of Internet users is in developing 
G-20 countries such as Brazil.193   The growth predictions from the implementation of 
the Internet of Things (IOT) (or as General Electric calls it “the Industrial Internet”) is 
even more astounding.  General Electric forecasts upward growth of $15 trillion to the 
global economy from the IOT, which would add 20% to the world’s economy.194  This 
new technology will only succeed with a strong Internet infrastructure, seamless flow of 
192 Powell, Alvin. "Happy Birthday Web." 11 03 2014. Harvard. 11 03 2014. <http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2014/03/happy-
birthday-web/?utm_source=SilverpopMailing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=03.12.daily%2520%281%29>. 
193 Boston Consulting Group. "The Connected World: The Internet Economy in the G-20." March 2012. BCG. 23 March 2014. 
<http://www.bcg.com/documents/file100409.pdf>. 
194 Evans, Peter C. and Marco Annunziata. "Industrial Internet: Pushing the Boundaries of Minds and Machines." 26 November 2012. 
General Electric. 23 March 2014. <http://www.ge.com/docs/chapters/Industrial_Internet.pdf>.p.34 
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information, support for the huge increase in data-flow, innovative leadership and 
technical talent, robust Internet security, and an Internet governance culture and 
leadership that supports these pioneering advances.195 
 
Multi-Stakeholder Internet Governance 
 Internet governance decides its accessibility, speed, security, and connectivity.  
The MSH model is a diverse multi-layered complex network of organizations, each with 
a different MSH composition.  Policy makers fight for equal Internet access for all, 
“global technical standardization ensures interoperability; cyber security maintains 
stability and authentication; and centralized coordination ensures that each Internet 
name and number is globally unique”.196  Presently, most IG is run by engineers, 
academics, civil society, business, and governments that can act and react to the speedy 
growth and technological changes, which are an inherent part of the global Internet.  
Authoritarian governments such as China find this organic, bottom-up Internet growth 
and leadership to be problematic.  China seeks tighter standards, regulations, and 
charges for Internet usage, much of the kind that the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) sets for telephone, telegraph, radio, and satellite frequencies.  The Chinese 
fear the present governance model is not sufficiently stable and secure.  Furthermore, 
they feel the present governance model favors U.S. companies and U.S. surveillance 
195 Ibid p.5 & 33 
196 DeNardis, Dr. Laura and Mark Dr. Raymond. Thinking Clearly about Multistakeholder Internet Governance. Eighth 




                                                          
capabilities, and undermines national sovereignty laws.197  Many of the changes China 
seeks will increase government control over the Internet and make government 
censorship easier to accomplish.   
Wang Chen, PRC Sate Council Chief of Information had this to say about an open 
Internet: “As long as our country is linked to the global Internet, there will be channels 
and means for all sorts of harmful foreign information to appear on our domestic 
Internet.  As long as our Internet is open to the public, there will be channels and means 
for netizens to express all sorts of speech on the Internet.  Unavoidably, many actual 
contradictions and problems in society are reported on the Internet”198  This fear and 
desire to control is held back only by China’s need to engage in the marketplace to 
continue their economic development.  China sees the US support of a free Internet and 
freedom of expression as a doctrinal weapon aimed to corrode the values and stability 
of their nation.   
 Much of this ideological struggle has focused on the leadership structure of the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and its subsidiary, the 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which in overseen by the U.S. Commerce 
Department’s National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA).  
ICANN is a non- profit organization that manages the Domain Name System (DNS), 
197 The Economist. "System Error: Governments Squabble Over New Rules for the Internet." 01 December 2012. The Economist.  23 
March 2014. <http://www.economist.com/news/21567340-governments-squabble-over-new-rules-internet-system-error>. 
198 Mueller, Milton. "China and Global Internet Governance: A Tiger By the Tail." Deibert, Ronald, et al. Access 
Contested: Security, Identity, and Resistance in Asian Cyberspace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012. 177-194.P.180  
Wang Chen, PRC State Council Chief of Information. April 29, 2010 
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which allocates domain names such as www.JHU.edu and translates these letters into 
numbers understood by computers.  “The Internet Domain Name System is a critical 
component of the Internet infrastructure.  The DNS associates user-friendly domain 
names (e.g., www.ntia.doc.gov) with the numeric network addresses (e.g., 
170.110.225.155) required to deliver information on the Internet, making the Internet 
easier for the public to navigate.”199  This function has been compared to names and 
numbers in a phonebook.  A name or business corresponds to a specific phone number; 
if the phone number is mistakenly allocated to two businesses, the system does not 
work.  Because ICANN has control over the DNS, it can decide who receives what 
address.  It also routes requests to the respective .com, .edu, .net, .gov websites.  This is 
a lot of power, which, if misused, could theoretically route Internet users away from 
certain websites and toward others.  ICANN also has control over what written 
languages can be used in Top-Level Domain Names.  Non-Latin written languages such 
as Chinese, Arabic, and Cyrillic have only been added since 2010.  Chinese top-level 
domains such as .中国 (.China), .公司 (.COM) ，and .网络 (.NET) are overseen by 
China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), not ICANN, and its 
registry is maintained by the China Internet Information Center (CNNIC).  This exposes 
them to CCP political manipulation.200 
199 NTIA. National Telecommunication and Information Administration. n.d. 23 03 2014. 
<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/domain-name-system>. 
200 Newman, Lily Hay. The US Is Trying to do the Right Thing About Internet Freedom, But it Could Backfire. 18 03 




                                                          
Authoritarian governments balk at the fact that this crucial function is under the 
oversight of the US government, and see this as a case of US information hegemony.  
China (in league with countries like Russia, Syria, and Iran) has sought to pry these 
functions from ICANN and transfer them to the ITU in order for sovereign nations to 
exert more control on their digital networks.  The ITU, as a UN organization, is 
controlled by governments rather than Internet stakeholders such as citizens, IT coders, 
commerce, and engineers.  Many feel as Rebecca Mackinnon, that the UN lends 
“legitimacy to dictators”201 by giving authoritarian governments a voice over that of 
their citizens, and this scheme will thwart freedom of information and as well as 
Internet innovation.  In 2012 at the World Conference on International 
Telecommunications (WCIT) in Dubai, 150 nations gathered to discuss this issue.  The 
negotiations at this conference made abundantly clear the depth of division over this 
Internet topic.  The key issue discussed was whether the International 
Telecommunications Regulations Treaty would be changed to include the Internet, and 
thus give this sector of IG to the ITU.  This revision would undermine the influence of 
Internet experts, and citizens.  Spam control, widely viewed as a means to censor 
Internet content in an internationally acceptable manner, was also discussed.  The 
number of countries that signed the treaty is thought to be eighty-nine, sobering proof 
of the level of dissatisfaction with the status quo.202  Representatives from the United 
 
201 MacKinnon, Rebecca. "Networked Authoritarianism in China and Beyond: Implications for Global Freedom." 
Liberation Technology in Authoritarian Regimes. Palo Alto: Stanford University, 2010.P.204 
202 Kehl, Danielle and Tim Maurer. "Did the U.N. Internet Governance Summit Actually Accomplish Anything?" 12 
August 2012. Slate. 23 March 2014. 
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States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and other likeminded countries walked out of 
the conference in protest.  This ideological divide loosely resembles that of the Cold 
War, but with so many developing countries just entering into the networked world, and 
so much at stake for global economies, the results of this vote reveals a depth of distrust 
in the status quo, and ignorance of the complex workings of the Internet.  These 
proceedings revealed an opportunity to build trust, educate the developing world about 
the Internet and its layers of expertise, and strengthen capacity building. 
The U.S. government actively seeks to maintain the multi-stakeholder Internet 
governance as its process as “rooted in democratic values, involving the participation of 
all interested stakeholders, and occurring in a transparent manner”.203  There are, 
however, many different views of what this multi-stakeholder Internet governance 
should look like.  The present model embodies the ideals of the California academics 
that helped create the Internet.  They planned this information realm to be trans-
governmental, and overseen by a diverse collection of world citizens.  This model, 
however, is not sustainable.  The economic health as well as national security of a 
majority of the world’s nations is aligned with the functionality and security of the 
Internet.  Furthermore, many physical components of the Internet are located in 
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private companies.  It is natural for countries to want to ensure the safety of these 
important economic and political interests.204   
The tension between information security and Internet freedom is shared by 
both sides of the debate.  China seeks to eliminate information it deems politically or 
socially destabilizing.  The United States seeks to monitor information it believe is 
harmful to national security.  The technology needed to censor and monitor 
information, whether the information is terrorist activity or dissident writings, child porn 
or poetry, criminal spam or legitimate emails,  is the same. This is a hotly debated issue 
with no clear answers.  The balance between security and liberty is only recognized as 
one swings by it, or in hindsight.  Transparent and accountable norms and standards 
that uphold the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) article’s 19 and 20, 
and expand the right to free expression and peaceful assembly to online would reassure 
global citizens.205   
Given the explosive growth of the Internet, especially the incorporation of the 
Internet of Things (IOT), ubiquitous networks and automated information processing 
will give those in control of information great power.  Governance must reflect these 
concerns as well; as data privacy, IP protection, content regulation, control of critical 
Internet resources and security of networks are all at stake.  Because of these serious 
204 Singer, P.W. and Allan Friedman. Cyber Security and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2014.P.181 
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issues, Laura DeNardis challenges the concept of and definition of multi-stakeholder 
model.  She sees Internet governance as multi-layered, resulting in a need for numerous 
coordinating and policy making tools.  Cybersecurity governance and standards setting, 
for instance, requires a different set of skills than privacy policy creation.206  
Furthermore, the notion of multi-stakeholder governance (MSHG) is misunderstood.  
The possible actors of MSHG are NGOs (assemblages of engineers, academics, civil 
society, and other interested groups), business, nation states, and intergovernmental 
organizations (IGO).  MSH definition holds that two or more categories of governance 
actors must be involved in decision-making.  ICANN is the best-known example of 
MSHG, but just one of many Internet governing groups, each consisting of a different set 
of participatory actors.  Although ICANN’s  participating members come from business, 
civil society, and governments, they are criticized for allowing too much US government 
influence (due to the Department of Commerce oversight), too little foreign government 
influence, and, at times, too little civil society input.207  There is also the question of 
whether business or government representation in governance groups is self-serving, 
and if their influence reflects what is best for the global Internet society. DeNardis 
emphasizes much of IG is not about content and usage.  It is about technology, 
architecture, management, and about how information actually flows.  Content and 
usage belongs in the world of policy makers.208 
206 DeNardis, Dr. Laura and Mark Dr. Raymond. Thinking Clearly about Multistakeholder Internet Governance. Eighth 
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Laura DeNardis outlines different models of rule setting organizations and 
procedures already influencing Internet governance.  One model is that of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  The mission of OECD 
to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people 
around the world.209  These principles are aimed at assisting policymakers preserve the 
fundamental openness of the Internet and protect the free flow of online information, 
while ensuring that privacy, children, intellectual property, and security are adequately 
protected.210  This ideal depends on a commitment to the rule of law, a restricted view 
of sovereignty, multilateral cooperation among states, and business self-regulation of 
technical standards.211    
China’s preferred model (as well as other many BRIC nations) would be similar to 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).   
“The SCO is primarily focused on security issues of its members: 
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Cyber-
security and cyber-warfare are prominent items on its agenda. Although 
civil society engagement with SCO is unlikely, it is worth following its 
processes.  As cyber-security becomes more prominent on the global 
agenda, civil society will have to be prepared to provide a balanced 
approach to online security that does not infringe on human rights.”212 
209 Karsten, Andreas. The OECD and Internet Governance. 29 05 2011. 24 03 2014. <http://weboftomorrow.eu/the-
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This form highlights the superior power of dominant countries in rule setting and a 
robust understanding of national sovereignty.   
The third view is that of the G-77.  This organization also holds a strong 
interpretation of sovereignty.  Many of the members are developing countries with a 
colonial past, as a result, their preference is a one-country one-vote situation where 
their voice is equal to that of a super power.  The ITU is one such organization.  A G-77 is 
currently proposing a “process for organizing a 2015 World Summit on Information 
Society (WSIS) Summit that would be entirely government-driven, with governments 
setting the agenda, negotiating outcome texts, and determining whether, and how, 
other stakeholders (including human rights advocates, industry, and technical experts) 
get to participate”213 
The fourth example is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and their 
Request for Comments (RFC) process.  The IEFT is truly MSH; anyone can participate, 
and deliberation is free and open.  It is the best example of the culture of the Internet 
technical community.  All participants are equal (though consist of mainly engineers) 
and adhere to the organization’s value of “rough consensus and running code”.214  
The last model is that of a business organization that follows a distinct set of 
rules and processes based on a need for accountability to their shareholders, the 
company’s chain of command, and contracts with other external organizations.  ICANN, 
213 Llanso, Emma and Matthew Shears. "G77 Hitting The Reset Button on Internet Governance?" 16 11 2013. Center 
for Democracy and Technology. 24 03 2014. <https://www.cdt.org/blogs/1611g77-hitting-reset-button-internet-
governance>. 
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as an industry regulator, controls the quantity and types of new Top Level Domains 
(TLD).  It has hierarchical regulatory authority over registrars and registries in generic 
Top Level Domains (gTLD), which is a big money making business.  The common view of 
ICANN as an organization with horizontal leadership is false, as it follows the above 
hierarchical model.215 
Milton Mueller is a serious devotee of internet freedom, and believes in as little 
governmental or organizational control as possible.  He believes people should have as 
few limits as possible concerning whom they interact with online, what information they 
disseminate, and what information they seek.  He agrees with Rebecca MacKinnon that 
the concept of national sovereignty is breaking down.  The idea of a territorial state 
deciding what individuals can and cannot do on the Internet is being replaced by the 
sovereign individual deciding how to interact online.216  He believes that government 
centered Internet governance can only lead to economic and human rights regulations.  
This, in turn, will slow the Internet’s technology innovations.  He stresses that expressive 
liberty and economic liberty are linked.  Restrict one, and the other is affected.  
American security fears have impact on civil liberties and privacy, which have led to a 
monitored flow of information.  This harms trust in the Internet and American values, 
which leads to economic losses.  China’s fear of destabilizing information influences 
215 Ibid P.15 
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their economy as well.217  For this reason, he advocates a bottom-up consortium of MSH 
organizations to govern the Internet rather than top-down control by governments.218 
In March of 2014, the Department of Commerce National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration (NTIA) announced its intent to end its oversight of the 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). The actual functions of IANA, the resolver 
of the “root zone file”, are run by ICANN.  The responsibilities of the IANA, as per Jon 
Postel, its founder, are these:  To set policy for and direct allocation of IP number blocks 
to regional Internet number registries; to Oversee operation of the authoritative 
Internet root server system; to oversee policy for determining when new TLD’s are 
added to the root system; and lastly, to coordinate Internet technical parameter 
assignments to maintain universal connectivity.219  
Milton Mueller, spurred by this chance to omit government control from ICANN 
decisions, wrote a blueprint about how to globalize this function.  First, separate the 
IANA technical functions from the ICANN policy process, and integrate IANA functions 
into Verisign.  Verisign serves as a domain name registries for the .com registry (among 
others) and is vital to Internet governance operations.  This combined entity would 
become a new “DNS Authority” (DNSA).  Mueller supports a leadership and oversight 
consortium of non-profit TLD registries and root server operators to run this new DNSA, 
he asserts that the technical root zone modification responsibilities of IANA must be 
217 Ibid P.263 
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separated from the policymaking process of ICANN.  IANA functions are purely technical 
and clerical, assuring that all top level domain names are unique and correlate to one 
set of IP numbers.  They also ensure that all additions and deletions and other changes 
are carried out.  ICANN’s policymaking process has say in who receives top-level domain 
names, what names are acceptable, as well as how many an organization or country 
should receive.  Mueller is clear that the IANA functions should be free of any 
government oversight, US or multilateral, as they are at the very core of the Internet’s 
technical function.  Security of IANA functions should also be left in the hands of 
specialists who understand the technology and have the commitment and involvement 
in the system to ensure it runs as efficiently and securely as possible. 220   
The crucial nature of the IANA functions is featured in a Guardian article about 
the key holders of the DNS core.  Every three months seven of fourteen key holders 
convene to create a new master key, which holds the codes needed to alter core 
functions of the root server.  To highlight the diversity of the ICANN leadership, the 
fourteen primary key holders hail from all four corners of the world.  Only seven need 
be present to form the master card, and in this meeting, they have traveled from 
Sweden, Russia, Latin America, Portugal, and the United States.  This key meeting is 
220 Mueller, Milton and Brenden Kuerbis. "Roadmap for Globalizing IANA: Four Principles and a Proposal for Reform." 




                                                          
aimed at Internet security.  A new master card is created to secure the core naming and 
numbering functions from hackers and intelligence agencies.221 
ICANN security vigilance and accountability is paramount, made clearer by the 
number of actors vying to grasp control of personal information.  Likewise, government 
involvement in Internet governance issues is a proxy for international struggles for 
economic and political power; governments cannot be the primary decision makers.  
MSH governance, however, is not a one-model fit all; rather it is an imperfect and 
constantly evolving mosaic of coordination.222  For this reason a top-down approach to 
IG would not work.  “The structure and governance of the Internet’s underlying 
infrastructure-comprising code, hardware, protocols, switches, and other virtual and 
physical resources- is hardly neutral but rather constrains behavior through technical 
design, direct governance, and private contractual agreements.”  As state power on the 
Internet is grows, so does the power of censorship and surveillance to control citizens.  
There is a dark side of cyberspace infrastructure and a covert domain of nation-state 
intelligence gathering and warfare in cyberspace.223  There are areas where government 
input is needed, such as in the protection of children, and multilateral agreements to 
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share information on identity theft and cybersecurity.224  Most of IG, however, is 
technical architecture and standard setting which needs to stay in the hands of 
innovative engineers who understand and evolve with the technology.  Private business 
contracts are responsible for much of the actual physical and virtual architectural 
foundations of the Internet.  Civil organizations deliberate over civil liberties.  MSH 
governance is a constantly shifting balance of power of these organizations.  To try to 
define what exactly MSH governance is, or how to fit it, into IG as if it were a puzzle 
piece, is counterproductive.225 
James Lewis of CSIS is more practical in his approach.  The desire for global 
governments to have input into Internet governance is strong and growing.  It cannot be 
ignored.  The best course would find some way to incorporate them, give them a say.  
Many countries are set on the UN one country, one vote model, especially developing 
countries with a small voice.  We must think about how to include them.  It is also 
important to remember that within a country, not every government bureau has the 
same outlook and opinion.  The Director of Economic Development may have a different 
view than the Director of Information.  It is important to reach out to many different 
areas of government when informing countries about the internet and internet 
governance.  The CCP, for instance, is not a technologically networked leadership that 
understands the intricacies of the Internet.  James Lewis says that most Chinese officials 
224 DeNardis, Dr. Laura and Mark Dr. Raymond. Thinking Clearly about Multistakeholder Internet Governance. Eighth 
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live in a pink bubble and only read the China Daily.226  Those officials, however, who are 
engaged in the technology sphere do have an understanding of the Internet and 
appreciate the complex task of governance. 
James Lewis is critical of the MSH IG as it operates right now.  He asserts that 
Internet governance lacks legitimacy in eyes of new users, and legitimacy is essential for 
security and authority.  The source of legitimacy in the past was “technical expertise, 
but this is being displaced in the political process”.227  He goes on to say the Internet is a 
critical global infrastructure and therefore needs adequate governance.  The current 
informal process among technologists and the business community is weakly linked to 
law enforcement and security.  Additionally, many netizens in the developing world, as 
well as BRIC nations, are skeptical about the true intentions of the United States.  The 
perception is that Internet architecture and processes, as well as the contracts between 
Internet companies, inequitably benefit US companies.  The current model lacks global 
authority, which is important element for a working governance system.  There are 
dangers in new models, however.  Alternatives could lead to less innovation and 
restricted human rights, but if carefully constructed could also support innovation and 
security.   
226 (Internet Society, North America Bureau) 1:51:20 
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Lewis feels the best way to increase legitimacy is to involve governments, and 
“create a web of relations and commitments among nation states.”228  His model falls 
somewhere between Mueller’s concept of a MSH IG with as little government influence 
as possible, and China’s desire for dominant state control.  Lewis is not in favor of 
extending national sovereignty in the digital realm to include actions that would restrict 
human rights, but rather seeks areas where government can play a role.  Trade, security, 
human rights, and law enforcement are spaces for international information sharing and 
coordination by governments.  Technology standards, coding and commercial 
arrangements are best left to the private sector. 
Lewis also emphasizes that the current MSH IG fails to address the issue of 
national sovereignty.  Physical cyber infrastructure resides in nation states and is subject 
to the laws and values of those nations.  Countries will implement rules and guidelines 
to mold the Internet to fit their countries beliefs and morals.  This is only natural.  He 
talks of a Southeast Asian country that prohibits pornography, and its leader does not 
understand why, on the Internet, his country must follow American values rather than 
their own.  This leader wants to change some of the Internet’s 1960s California values to 
fit his country’s conservative morals.  This is where the United States is losing the 
struggle for the Internet.  Present IG portrays the struggle for the internet as black and 
white, Western liberty loving countries against authoritarian dictatorships.  In fact, most 
countries are somewhere in-between.  They are the SE Asian country mentioned above, 
228 Lewis, James A. "Internet Governance: Inevitable Transitions." 2013. Center for International Governance 
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alarmed at the influx of American values, but also in need of Internet development and 
the economic boost it can bring.  The United States should be more sensitive to their 
needs, and support  IG, which includes these developing nations by discussing and 
implementing capacity building.229  Nations have differing views of laws, cultural values, 
and regulations on the Internet.  Nations should have the right to employ boundaries as 
long as they do not break universal laws. 
Peter Singer of Brookings agrees with Lewis that a borderless realm, where 
problems are solved with little government involvement, is not realistic.  Because 
economic, political, and national security interests of nations are now dependent on the 
Internet, it is natural for governments to want to exert more control.230  Lewis asserts 
that Internet governance must find “the balance between government and private 
sector, between U.S. and global, and between sovereignty and human rights.”231  IG, in 
places, is neither market-based, nor legally constructed.  No wonder many question its 
legitimacy.232  Furthermore, there is not a clear understanding of how the MSH model 
works, undermining trust in the system.  Citizens naturally want their government to be 
involved in order to safeguard their future.  Dmitry Burkov, a Russian Internet security 
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expert and ICANN key holder states, “The key issue with the Internet is always trust.  No 
matter what the forum, it always comes down to trust.”233     
 
Sanctity of the DNS 
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a critical Internet resource, foundational to 
the basic function of the Internet.  Every object that communicates via the network 
(whether it is a smartphone, computer, or with the advent of the Internet of things 
(IOT), a refrigerator, door, car etc..) has been assigned a distinct Internet Protocol (IP) 
address.  Every website has a unique name.  Because this function is the most tangible 
role of IG, it has become a proxy for the battle over IG.  “Control of the Internet names 
and numbers is considerable power”.234  These names and numbers have are not freely 
exchanged in the marketplace, but rather, they are controlled by MSH institutions such 
as ICANN, IANA, RIR, DNS registries, and domain name registrars.  This brings up many 
questions.  Governments, businesses, and world citizens want to know if there are 
enough to meet global demand, and if they are impartially allocated.  Do the unique 
numerical addresses undermine privacy and anonymity online?  Who decides who 
receives certain high demand website address?  People can impersonate other entities 
online by creating a website similar to trademarked names.  How can trademark laws 
233 Ball, James. "Meet the Seen People Who Hold the Keys to Worldwide Internet Security." 28 02 2014. Guardian. 29 
03 2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/28/seven-people-keys-worldwide-internet-security-
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put an end to this?  What is the impact of the DNS being used for copyright 
enforcement?235    
 “The ability of governments to control the flow of information via laws and 
other mechanisms of traditional authority has shifted battles into the domain of 
Internet infrastructure governance.”236  Many forces are working to change the Internet 
at its core; and have attempted to block entire websites via the DNS.237  In 2012, the 
United States Congress proposed the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOFA), and the Protect IP 
Act (PIPA) to curb copyright infringements and the trafficking of counterfeit goods.  They 
planned to accomplish this by IP blocking.  This would require DNS servers to decline 
requests for IP addresses of those engaged in illegal copyright and counterfeit activities.  
In short, SOFA/PIPA would give the Justice Department the ability to shut down almost 
any blog or website at will.  This, however, places a burden on the Internet 
infrastructure, and harms its integrity.  Furthermore, censorship at the core of Internet 
structure is a bad precedent, and in the end would have little impact on IP theft and 
counterfeiting.238    
China also recognizes the potential power inherent in DNS.  China uses the DNS 
to identify requests for certain words in web names, and misdirects those requests by 
providing erroneous addresses, thus making such sites inaccessible.  If Western Internet 
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users’ website requests are routed through China, this censorship can apply to their 
requests as well.239 
China understands the key to censorship and control inexists in the DNS.  The 
IETF has received proposals from China to change the basic architecture of the DNS 
system, which would effectively segment the Internet into bordered domains separated 
by firewalls.  The implementation of this sort of proposal would add friction to the 
Internet, reduce computing speed, and could even crash the system.  Separate from the 
engineering difficulties inherent in this proposal is the veiled political agenda to 
heighten their ability to censor, manipulate, and block DNS and IP addresses.240 
  In an attempt to meddle with the Internet’s technology architecture, in January 
of 2014, Chinese Internet engineers  running the Great Firewall in China  tried to block 
the domains of many companies in the United States that provide tools for evading the 
“Firewall”.  Instead, they re-routed a large quantity of traffic to these companies.  This 
resulted in the malfunction of approximately 75% of China’s domain name servers.  
There was an eight-hour loss of services for many of China’s 500 million Internet 
users.241 
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 Distrustful that all 13 Internet ‘root servers’ were in America, the West or Japan, 
China asked ICANN to create another one.  “Root servers are the starting point for all 
the hierarchical resolution process that makes domain names globally unique and 
matches IP addresses to domains”.242  To accommodate China, one was implemented 
from an existing one in order to maintain compatibility.  This has caused problems in 
international traffic, as information is inadvertently routed through China’s root servers, 
and is mistakenly subjected to the ‘firewall’.243  Furthermore, China created a parallel 
DNS root for Chinese character domain names such as .中国 (.China), .公司 (.COM) ，
and .网络 (.NET).  These domain names are now compatible (but it is not know exactly 
how compatible) with the global DNS system, but operated by New.Net, not ICANN.244 
There is, therefore, world support for less U.S. control over the governance of 
the Internet (especially after the Snowdon revelations).  Even the EU has expresses a 
desire for more transparency and less US influence over institutions controlling the 
Internet.  The EU also urged leaders to take a robust role in defining the future of the 
Internet.  Lawrence Strickling, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Communications and Information, has welcomed the EU commitment to MSH IG and 
242 Mueller, Milton. "China and Global Internet Governance: A Tiger By the Tail." Deibert, Ronald, et al. Access 
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 The functions of ICANN are crucial to the efficiency and integrity of the Internet.  
Although ICANN responsibilities are mostly technical and administrative, decisions made 
have impact in Internet security, privacy, allocation of profitable business contracts, 
innovation, and Internet development.  The governance of ICANN is vital to the health 
and sound efficiency of the global Internet.  ICANN is not interested in using its 
capabilities to alter the DNS to censorship or blocking of certain groups, it is largely a 
technical group interested in an unhindered network.   
 The ICANN oversight by NTIA has worked since its inception, but many 
recent activities have caused Internet citizens from Europe as well as developing nations 
and authoritarian nations, to lose faith in this arrangement.  The Snowdon revelations, 
coupled with the Target data breech, exposed the capabilities and vulnerabilities of 
hidden data miners on the Internet.  “Internet governance structures were originally 






                                                          
based on familiarity, trust and expertise and ‘rough consensus and running code’”246 
This is not true anymore, and structures must change to meet the new reality.   
The question of how these Internet structures should change is at the center of 
the geo-political struggle for IG.  “Internet governance is the simplest most direct and 
inclusive label for the ongoing disputes and deliberations over how the Internet is 
coordinated, managed, and shaped to reflect policies”247  IG negotiations will need to 
incorporate as diverse an assembly as possible in order to gain legitimacy. 
Milton Mueller and Rebecca MacKinnon have argued for limited government 
control.  They believe the technical community working in parallel with civil society and 
business can efficiently react to Internet issues as innovations rapidly expand and alter 
networks.  Security and privacy regulations are implemented to help, but also harm.  
Technology used to uncover a terrorist is used by authoritarian regimes to reveal 
dissidents.  Likewise, methods used to stop spam or child pornography, and be used to 
block private communications.  Mueller and MacKinnon warn about government usage 
of these technologies. 
Laura DeNardis, a practical engineer, points out that much of IG is very technical 
and specialized, implemented by engineers and computer scientists.  Governments do 
not have the skills to carry out these tasks with the same ability.  However, there are 
also areas of IG that only governments can carry out, such as capacity building, 
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information sharing, and cooperation on cyber-criminal activity, and child protection.  
Business is needed to implement the many business contracts, such as VeriSign’s 
contract with ICANN to manage the .com registry.  Civil society should continue to 
organize and educate global citizens about their online rights. 
Singer and Lewis call for IG to recognize the needs of the developing world.  The 
current IG is not legitimate in the eyes of these countries.  International NGOs such as 
the Internet Society (ISOC) are fanning the globe, educating people and governments 
about MSH IG and the economic advantages of a free Internet.  The ITU can use their 
abilities to help developing nations capacity build.  There is a need to find a role in IG for 
governments to have impact; network building and citizen education are two such 
areas.  The security of the Internet depends on employing practices that do not increase 
division among nations, but rather are practical and useful.  
  The responsibilities of ICANN will only continue to grow.  Right now, the 
IP system is called IPv4.  This system allows for about 4.3 billion addresses.  With the 
recent explosion of the Internet due to the IOT, available IP addresses are dwindling.  A 
new IP address system called IPv6 allows for 
340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 IP addresses, more than there 
are known atoms in the universe.248   It is therefore imperative that ICANN governance 
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gain the trust of Internet users, and that governance is transparent and reflects their 
needs. 
 Egyptian ICANN CEO, Fadi Chehade states “Clearly there is no question the 
Edward Snowdon revelations have stimulated the dialogue” about trust.  Leaders at the 
World Economic Forum, as well as large company CEOs have worried about trust.  Trust 
on the Internet has definitely diminished.  The way to combat this lack of trust is to 
develop global governance networks:  not institutions, or regulations, but networks.  
The Internet needs to become more diverse and visible to new users.  Only in this way 
will it gain legitimacy.   
In response to China’s desire to place walls around their Internet, or change the 
core DNS, Fadi says that national boundaries on the Internet will create Internet friction.  
The cost will be economic and social.  The inability to freely and instantaneously 
exchange information will thwart innovation, but also influence a citizen’s ability to 
access resources to aid in their self-education.  This will leave citizens in information-
controlled environments monetarily and intellectually inferior.249  
The IOT will amplify the economic advantages of the Internet, and the struggle 
for who controls the mega-data collected.  This data will allow great advances in many 
areas including environmental engineering, medicine, energy efficiency, agriculture, and 
healthcare.  It will also define people’s most intimate habits.  China has invested heavily 





                                                          
in the IOT sector, investing 140.5 billion RMB in 2013 the Wuxi city IOT Park.250    
Because every device connected to the Internet must have an IP address, the job of 
ICANN is growing in size and importance.  As the IOT grows, networks will expand, and 
data in the digital domain will explode, revealing humankind’s contacts, values, ideals, 
habits, communications, and locations.  This data should not be under the dominion of a 
government or a group of governments.  Information is power, and must be kept in the 
hands of citizens through transparent governance.  While mega-data in industry will 
lead to helpful innovations, the core functions of the Internet managed by ICANN should 
not be used for monitoring or manipulating network communications.   
 As developing nations build Internet capacity, they will receive the economic 
benefits of the Internet economy.  Countries will also witness an influx of contradictory 
morals and values.  In order to preserve their culture and values, countries will want 
some sovereign control over their country’s Internet.  The recent creations of generic 
top-level domain (gTLD) in non-Latin characters will help countries keep their language 
relevant, which will help support the survival of the world’s languages.251   
ICANN and other Internet governance organizations strive for diversity.  
Legitimacy is earned through trust, and trust is earned through transparency, 
accountability, and faith that one’s voice will be heard.  The current IG path espoused by 
ICANN, ISOC, and the IETF seeks for all nations to have a place at the governance table.  
250 Wuxi Governement China. "Making the Industry of Internet of Things in Wuxi." 27 03 2014. Wuxi China. 28 03 
2014. 
 
251 Chinese, Cyrillic and Arabic so far, but I advocate for as many as possible.  Mike Nelson of Microsoft mentioned, in 
a IG conference, that language translation software will soon solve any web based language difficulties. 
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Strong American values of free speech and expression stand defiantly in opposition to 
China’s massive information control apparatus.  Developing nations stand warily 
between the two.  Internet governance must have the flexibility to reach out to those 
wavering nations through education, capacity building, and bearing witness to their 
concerns.  The alternative is a fractured, walled network, or worse.  An Internet in 
China’s likeness places information power in the hands of government elites, 















 China has shown its opposition to the present Internet culture of freedom of 
expression.  The authoritarian CCP favors information control, and communications 
norms and standards that put information and its conduits in the hands of government 
elites.  The United States adheres to liberal Western values, which supports freedom of 
expression, rights to privacy and government transparency and accountability.  This is a 
fundamental difference of opinion.  CCP sponsored programs have actively censored, 
manipulated, sabotaged, and siphoned information from domestic and foreign digital 
networks.  This activity presents the United States with multiple security issues, as they 
pose risk to business, personal, military, political, and diplomatic communications, and 
must be addressed.  The issue is multidimensional, however, and therefore deserves a 
multipronged solution.  
 The first issue both countries must address is a mutual lack of trust.  China fears 
the Internet, a U.S. military innovation, is an information tool used by the U.S. to cause 
internal instability in China.  Snowdon’s revelations about NSA surveillance only confirm 
these fears, as does China’s history of humiliation at the hands of Western powers.  
Understanding these fears and addressing them through political, educational, and 
military exchanges is a start.   
 Secondly, as China rises it will naturally want to project its power.  The rules that 
presently govern international institutions were predominantly made by Western 
powers.  Although these rules have supported global economic growth, China argues 
108 
 
they have predominately benefited the West.  In China’s quest to become a world 
power, it had shown a desire to become a rule maker, developing and internationalizing 
rules that will benefit China.  This is the basic issue at play in the ICANN governance 
struggle portrayed in chapter three.  China fears the present Internet norms and 
technical standards benefit U.S. businesses unequally, and seek to undermine CCP 
authority.  Of course, greater government control over Internet architecture will 
streamline censorship and general control of sovereign Internet function.  This will 
simplify control of communications and human expression within China, and create a 
stronger barrier to information entering and exiting China. While the present rules have 
paved the way for global economic development, a blocked and bureaucratic Internet 
would slow Internet’s underlying architecture and thwart innovation.   Thus, both the 
United States and China see Internet governance as a national security issue.  The first 
course is to find areas of common interest.  Both countries support capacity building in 
developing nations, specifically as an ITU multinational endeavor.  Both countries 
experience cybercrime and want to eradicate it.  Information sharing and collaboration 
on norms and standards in this area would be a positive step, and may develop common 
definitions of Internet terms and a mutual understanding of this new language.  In this 
effort to forge common ground, however, the U.S. must not allow change to the current 
multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.  A bureaucratic top-down approach to 
governance over the technical architecture of the Internet would greatly alter the ease 
of communication now experienced.  The United States must ally with like-minded 
countries, and work to persuade developing nations to block China’s attempt to change 
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Internet governance.  The United States still has the power to be a global rule maker, 
and must use this power now to ensure the future of the Internet.  China and Russia will 
use the example of NSA’s metadata collection to illustrate the untrustworthiness of the 
United States.  The United States, in turn, must emphasize U.S. judicial, legislative, and 
executive oversight of the NSA’s collection (not surveillance!) of data.  The present 
debate on this issue in the United States elucidates the comparatively transparent and 
accountable nature of US politics.  This display of checks and balances on the global 
stage should soothe fears.  Nevertheless, this issue does show the need for reforms that 
reflect the changes brought by the expansion of the Internet. 
The U.S. led Internet governance model, however, also must be sensitive to the 
diversity of cultural and values issues that arise.  Nations should have the ability to mold 
their country’s Internet to reflect the citizen’s values.  These actions, however, must be 
transparent to a nation’s citizens. 
Transparency, however, is not a CCP strong suit.  China’s internal information 
control mechanisms are secretive and frightening.  Propaganda is at every level of 
society; censorship, communications manipulation, and blocks to freedom of expression 
are implemented by technical means, policing, and by millions of hired censors.  By 
these means, the CCP uses its powerful information control mechanisms to endorse, 
control, and nurture nationalism.  These nationalistic passions can be unpredictable, and 
have influenced Chinese foreign policy toward a more hawkish stance to appease them.  
It is important for U.S. policy makers to be mindful of this precedent before reacting to 
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Chinese actions, or when analyzing escalating situations.  Simultaneously, the United 
States must work to expose Chinese citizens to alternative viewpoints through 
professional and educational exchanges, organizations, and alternative media venues.  
These information outlets can serve to inform the grass-roots nationalist citizenry.  
While also proud and patriotic, these nationalists are not as aligned with the CCP victim 
paradigm, and do not view foreign nations with hatred and resentment without 
provocation.  They strive to build a more just and equitable China.  While they are 
worldlier, they are also unpredictable.  Nevertheless, they present an opportunity for 
future US-China collaboration, as well as to the more forward thinking reform minded 
Chinese leaders. 
When evaluating China’s conduct in the digital realm, policy makers must 
question whether China’ behavior is peaceful.  China’s efforts to steal, sabotage, and 
manipulate information on U.S. networks is clearly contrary to China’s ‘peaceful rise’ 
tenet of non-interference in the affairs of another country.  The technical architecture 
elements of cyberspace all reside within the boundaries of a sovereign nation.  China’s 
massive IP theft campaigns from U.S. business, military, and government networks are 
by a self-interested CCP to ensure regime legitimacy and stability.  These thefts fuel an 
economy hungry for technology, but low on high-tech innovation.  This adds to U.S.-
China distrust, as does China’s refusal to acknowledge this theft, even in the face of 
evidence.  The United States cannot be passive about this theft and sabotage.  This 




The United States is presently the most powerful nation on earth.  It should use 
its position to influence cyber policy and Internet governance now.  Time is critical.  The 
Internet is still young and growing at an explosive rate.  The Internet of Things will 
expand the digital networks exponentially, capturing massive amounts of useful data as 
a byproduct.  This data can be used to benefit humanity in yet to be imagined ways.  
Likewise, it can be used by authoritarian governments and repressive regimes to 
suppress.  The United States must continue to be a leader in government transparency 
and accountability to counter this.  Furthermore, the United States must couple with 
likeminded countries, persuading developing nations that a free and open Internet 
supports economic development, and furthering the creation of norms and standards 
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